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Abstract
In 2020, the Chinese Civil Code came into effect. Article 1176 of the code
offers a statutory defense for those participating in “a recreational or sports activity carrying certain risk” when they cause injury to other participants. However, the Chinese Civil Code does not specify how or to what extent Article 1176
may be relied upon as a statutory defense in assessing the tortious liability of the
organizers of such recreational or sports activities. The courts in China have long
sought to develop a principled approach to applying the voluntary assumption of
risk defense to such organizers. This Article provides a case study to examine how
Article 1176 operates in the context of motor racing activities, identifying sources
of uncertainty surrounding the application of the law. By reviewing how Australian law analyses the duty and liability of event organizers, this Article also identifies the strengths of the Australian approach and how it may inform Chinese law
with respect to addressing the problems associated with Article 1176.

I. BACKGROUND
This Article uses a case study to examine legal issues in tortious claims relating to motor racing activities. In the Zhejiang International Circuit case, a driver
died in a car racing accident and the family attributed the death to the organizer’s
failure in exercising the duty of safety protection. The organizer attempted to rely
on the exemption clause for exclusion of liability, claiming that the victim voluntarily assumed risks when participating in the car racing activity.1 Specific issues
arising from this case include whether the provision of adequate medical support
and effective rescue should be deemed part of a sporting event organizer’s legal
duty and how to assess an organizer’s liability in the context of tortious claims
associated with dangerous sports activities. 2 Before Article 1176 of the Chinese
Civil Code—China’s version of the common law concept of voluntary assumption
of risk (VAR)—came into effect in 2021, Chinese law lacked specific provisions
for regulating inherently dangerous or highly competitive sports. 3 Furthermore,
Article 1176 only applies to the allocation of liability among participants in such
sports; it does not consider whether the organizers of such sports events have fully
1

SHAO XING RI BAO (紹興日報) [SHAO XING DAILY], Zhe Qi Che Hui Ren Wang de
Shi Gu, Gai Zen Me Kan? (這起車毀人亡的事故，該怎麽看?) [How to View this Tragic
Racing Incident?] (Nov. 29, 2018), http://www.shaoxing.com.cn/xinwen/p/2686565.html.
2 Jian Pan Che Shen Jiao (键盘车神教), Zhe Sai Bao Ma M3 Qi Huo, Che Shou Si
Wang, Sai Dao Fang Que Shuo “Wo Men Shi Mei You Ze Ren de”?
(浙赛宝马M3起火，车手死亡，赛道方却说“我们是没有责任的”?) [A BMW M3
Caught Fire at the Zhejiang International Circuit, Leading to the Death of the Driver, But
the Organizers Claimed They Are Not Responsible] QI CHE ZHI JIA (汽車之家) [AUTO
HOME] (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:39 PM), https://chejiahao.autohome.com.cn/info/3007375.
3 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Dian (中华人民共和国民法典) [Civil Code
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., May 28,
2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021), art. 1176, 2020 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ. (CIVIL CODE SPECIAL ISSUE) 2 [hereinafter Chinese Civil Code].
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discharged their duty of safety protection, nor what liability they should bear for
their failure to do so. Against this background, this Article reviews a specific set
of circumstances in which Article 1176 overlaps with an organizer’s duty of safety
protection. This Article identifies various uncertainties regarding the legal effect
of the VAR defense under Article 1176. It also explores the insights and experience that Australian tort law defenses may provide for the potential reform of
China’s Article 1176 under similar circumstances.
This Article comprises five parts. The first section (Background) describes the
factual scenario of the case in question and the issues that it raises. The second
section (Legal Issues in Sports Injury Claims) evaluates whether the provision of
adequate medical support and effective rescue should be considered part of an
organizer’s duty of safety protection and highlights areas of controversy surrounding the application of China’s Article 1176. The third section (Australian Position)
reviews how Australian tort law analyses an organizer’s duty of care in the context
of motorsports activities and the rationale for this approach. The fourth section
(Implications of the Australian Experience) shows how Australia’s approach
could inform the development of Chinese tort law. The fifth section concludes the
Article.

A. Factual Scenario
On November 22, 2018, during a track day at the Zhejiang International Circuit, a BMW M3 racing car crashed into cement piers inside the track.4 The impact
rendered the driver unconscious.5 Two minutes later, rescue teams arrived; however, it was too late.6 The driver did not survive the incident.7 The organizer of
the event claimed that the driver had been fully aware of the risks involved in
motor racing and that it had fulfilled its legal obligation as organizer by conducting the rescue, and therefore did not bear any liability for the driver’s death. 8 As
an additional defense, the organizer asserted that it could not be held liable according to the exemption clause in its contract with drivers.9 However, the family
of the victim suspected that the protective wall involved in the crash did not meet
The Wikipedia page for the “Zhejiang International Circuit” provides an introduction
to this incident. See Zhe Jiang Guo Ji Sai Che Chang (浙江国际赛车场) [Zhejiang International Circuit], WIKIPEDIA (June 15, 2022), https://zh.wikipedia.org/zhhk/浙江國際賽車場.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. The time of the rescue was contested by both sides: the victim’s wife claimed that
the rescue took more than two minutes while the organizer claimed that the rescue team
arrived in about one and a half minutes. See Zhang Fu Kai Bao Ma Sang Ming, Shao Fu
Zai Shi Fa Xian Chang Tou Tou Lu Xia Si Wang Shun Jian (丈夫开宝马丧命 少妇在事
发现场偷偷录下死亡瞬间) [Husband Died Racing in BMW, Wife Secretly Recorded Surveillance
Tape],
XIN
LANG
(新浪)
[SINA]
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://news.sina.com.cn/s/2018-11-29/doc-ihpevhcm3427623.shtml.
8 Id.
9 Id.
4
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the applicable safety standards and questioned whether staff were sufficiently
trained and qualified to provide assistance.10 Moreover, they claimed that the
driver’s death resulted from the failure to provide immediate and effective rescue,
as the rescuers’ delay caused the “golden time” for survival to be missed. 11
The waiver signed by the driver mentioned neither medical support nor emergency rescue.12 According to the written waiver, the victim had acknowledged
that he understood the risks involved in motor racing. Although the waiver described multiple potential risks such as health conditions that could have impact
on driving ability, driver’s use of alcohol or substance abuse that could affect his
judgment when utilizing equipment, and facilities provided by the circuit, the list
was not exhaustive. This led to the key issue of this case: whether the victim could
have foreseen the organizer’s negligence in failing to provide timely and effective
rescue in a sports activity that could potentially lead to participants’ personal injury or death, or whether the organizer should be able to claim exemption from
liability on the grounds that the victim had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury
or death when participating in the activity.
Similar incidents have drawn public attention to China’s emerging motor racing industry, and tort claims arising from personal injuries sustained by participants in dangerous sports activities have spurred ongoing debate. This Article discusses the legal issues related to such sports injury claims in China, specifically
in the motor racing industry, and draws implications for the future development
of the law via a case study.

B. Legal Background
i.

Regulatory Landscape of Motorsports in China

In general, motor racing events are divided into the following two categories:
competitive activities, which aim at setting new records and creating new winners,
and mass activities, in which participants engage merely for relaxation and enjoyment.13 However, this division is unclear, as “mass activities” is not a legal term;
Zhejiang Satellite TV interviewed the victim’s wife and the Vice President of
Zhejiang International Circuit. Yi Ba Yi Ba Huang Jin Yan (1818黄金眼), Bao Ma Kai Jin
Sai Dao, Lao Gong Zai Mei Hui Lai (【1818黄金眼】宝马开进赛道 老公再没回来)
[BMW Entered Race Circuit, Husband Never Come Back], YOUTUBE (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11FbuRiV9oo.
11 Id.
12 Zhe Jiang Guo Ji Sai Che Chang (浙江国际赛车场) [Zhejiang International Circuit],
Zhe Jiang Guo Ji Sai Che Chang Sai Dao Jia Shi Huo Dong Cheng Ruo Shu
(浙江国际赛车场赛道驾驶活动承诺书) [Declaration on (Assumption of Risk Relating
to) Racing Activity], BAI DU WEN KU (百度文库) [BAI DU FILES] (Jan. 10, 2022),
https://wenku.baidu.com/view/4a6f38f8142ded630b1c59eef8c75fbfc77d94ed.html [hereinafter ZIC Disclaimer].
13 “Mass sports” and “competitive sports” are not legally defined terms; however, they
are used in Chinese government documents. See, e.g., GUOWUYUAN GUANYU YINFA
QUANMIN
JIANSHEN
JIHUA
(2016-2020NIAN)
DE
TONGZHI
10
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it generally refers to sports and cultural or social activities that are open to the
public or to an unspecified number of persons. 14 In China, competitive sports have
a long history of being regulated by administrative bodies at the national and district levels.15 However, under the current legal framework, there are no specific
regulations for mass sports, only some general guiding principles according to the
National Fitness Plan issued by the central government.16

ii.

Regulating Sports Involving Inherent Risk

The theory of “permissible risk” is used to analyze tortious liability in sports
injury claims. This theory argues that the law should allow, within certain limits,
tortious conduct that “inevitably hurts [the] legitimate interest[s] [of participants]
but is necessary and essential for the development of society.” 17 As applied to
tortious conduct occurring during sports activities involving inherent risk, the theory perceives such conduct is of “unique value to mankind” and that possible injury sustained by players is “the price paid in challenging the limits of physical
extremes of humans.”18 However, scholars argue that tortious conduct should only
be tolerated by the law to a certain extent and that when the rules of a game are
deliberately violated by participants, resulting in serious injury to other participants, the law must intervene.19 In such cases, the conduct exceeds the boundaries
that can be justified under the theory and constitutes a threat to personal safety,
an important interest that the law must protect. 20 The Supreme People’s Court of
China states that if a participant’s conduct seriously violates the ethical rules of a

(国务院关于印发全民健身计划(2016–2020年) 的通知) [NOTICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL
ON PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTING THE NATIONAL FITNESS PLAN (2016–2020)] (promulgated
by the St. Council, June 15, 2016, effective June 15, 2016), Guo fa [2016] No. 37, ch. 7,
CLI.2.272882 (PKULaw) [hereinafter NOTICE OF THE NATIONAL FITNESS PLAN].
14 CHENG XIAO (程啸), QINQUAN ZEREN FA (侵权责任法) [TORT LAW] 464 (2019).
15 Quanguo Qiche Yundong Guanli Guiding (全国汽车运动管理规定) [National Automobile Sports Management Regulations] (promulgated by the Gen. Admin. Sport China,
Oct. 12, 2001, effective Oct. 12, 2001), Ti Qi Lian Zi [2001] No. 122, CLI.4.48001 (PKULaw), invalidated by Guojia Tiyuzongju Guanyu Feizhi he Xiugai Bufen Guizhang he
Zhengcexing
Wenjian
de
Jueding
(国家体育总局关于废止和修改部分规章和政策性文件的决定) [Decision to Abolish
and Revise Some Regulations and Policy Documents] Ti Yu Zong Ju Ling [2016] No. 22
(promulgated by the Gen. Admin. Sport China, May 9, 2016, effective May 9, 2016),
CLI.4.278881 (PKULaw).
16 In this document, the State Council elaborated on the guiding principles, targeted
goals, and main tasks involved in promoting mass sports. NOTICE OF THE NATIONAL
FITNESS PLAN, supra note 13.
17 Qian Yeliu (钱叶六), Jingji Tiyu Shanghai Xingwei de Zhengdanghua Genju Ji
Bianjie (竞技体育伤害行为的正当化根据及边界) [Proper Foundation and Boundary of
the Injurious Act in Competitive Sports], 3 FAXUE JIA (法学家) [THE JURIST] 99, 99 (2017).
18 Id. at 103.
19 Id. at 108–11.
20 Id. at 111.
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sports activity and causes extremely serious harm, the court shall support the
claim for damages.21
Before Article 1176 of the Civil Code was enacted, there were no specific
regulations addressing inherently risky sports, except for the general provisions
of the Law of Torts.22 Compared with comparatively safe, amateur, fun-seeking
activities participated in by the public (i.e., mass activities), such sports are known
for their dangerous nature and the excitement they generate, which probably constitute their very attraction for participants. Such dangerous sports activities demand a different legislative mechanism to regulate the various parties’ rights and
interests than that which regulates sports activities involving a much lower level
of risk, despite the lack of distinction between the two under the Law of Torts.

iii.

Article 1176 of the Civil Code

A new provision in the recently enacted Chinese Civil Code helps to fill the
above-mentioned legal gap. Article 1176 of the Civil Code stipulates that:
Where a voluntary participant in a recreational or sports activity
carrying certain risk sustains harm caused by another participant,
the victim may not require the other participant to assume tort liability, unless the harm is caused intentionally by, or through
gross negligence on the part of, the other participant.23
This provision is viewed as the Chinese version of the VAR and is meant to
solve sports injury-related tort claims involving dangerous sports such as diving
and motor racing.24 The legislative intent of Article 1176 is to protect citizens’
autonomy to engage in such sports or other recreational activities by freeing participants from concerns about potential tortious liability. 25 The provision targets
sports and other recreational activities that carry a certain level of risk. It was the
view of the Constitution and Law Committee (the Committee) that VAR rules
21 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN QUANGUO MINSHI SHENPAN GONGZUO HUIYI JIYAO
(最高人民法院全国民事审判工作会议纪要) [EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL
WORKING CONFERENCE ON CIVIL TRIALS] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 22–
24, 2011), art. 49, Fa Ban No. 442, Oct. 9, 2011. See Yang Lixin (杨立新), Zigan Fengxian:
Bentuhua De Gainian Dingyi、Leixing Jiegou Yu Falv Shiyong (自甘风险:
本土化的概念定义、类型结构与法律适用—
以白银山地马拉松越野赛体育事故为视角) [Voluntary Assumption of Risk: Localizing
Conceptualization, Classification and Legal Application from the Perspective of a Silver
Marathon Sports Accident], 4 DONGFANG FAXUE (东方法学) [ORIENTAL L.] 107, 112
(2021).
22 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法)
[Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009), repealed by Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3.
23 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1176.
24 Yang Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21, at 112.
25 Id.
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should not be widely applied but rather limited to these activities. 26 Initially, the
wording “dangerous activities” was considered for inclusion instead of “recreational or sports activities carrying certain risk.”27 However, the term “dangerous
activities” was viewed as too general, and there was concern that adopting the
term would cause conflict between Article 1176 and certain provisions of the Law
of Torts that categorize certain dangerous activities as special tortious conduct
because the principle adopted to allocate tortious liability is entirely different from
that adopted by Article 1176.28
While Article 1176 applies to the liability of sports participants, the Civil Code
addresses the liability of organizers of mass activities in several other provisions
(Articles 1198–1201).29 Article 1198 of the Civil Code is said to “inherit” Article
37 of the Law of Torts, which treated organizers of mass activities as a special
type of tortfeasor and imposed a special legal duty—that of safety protection—on
them.30 A number of scholars argue that the provisions of the Civil Code addressing the liability of organizers of mass sports and other activities inherit rather than
repeal the corresponding provisions in the Law of Torts. 31 Although legislators
have made certain adjustments in the Civil Code, these scholars claim that such
revisions are merely technical, rather than structural or substantial. 32
The legal effect of the Chinese version of VAR is limited in the sense that
Article 1176 addresses tortious liability among participants only. The law does
26 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa He Falv Weiyuanhui Guanyu 《Minfa Dian
Qinquan
Zeren
Bian
(Cao’an)
》Xiugai
Qingkuang
de
Huibao
(全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会关于《民法典侵权责任编（草案）》修改情
况的汇报) [Report on the Revision of the Chapter of Tort Liability in the Civil Code
(Draft)] (promulgated by the Const. & L. Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 23, 2018), ch.
2.
27 Zhou Xiaochen (周晓晨), Lun Shouhai Ren Zigan Maoxian Xianxiang de Qinquan
Fa Guizhi (论受害人自甘冒险现象的侵权法规制) [Commentary on Tortious Regulation
of Victim’s Voluntary Assumption of Risk], 2 DANGDAI FAXUE (当代法学) [CONTEMP. L.
REV.] 33, 42 (2020).
28 Id.
29 Article 1176 of the Chinese Civil Code stipulates that “the liability of the organizer
of the activity shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 1198 through 1201 of this
Code.” See Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1176. While Article 1198 addresses
mass activity organizers’ liability in a general sense, Articles 1199–1201 focus on kindergartens’ and other educational institutions’ liability in tort claims related to personal injury.
Id. at arts. 1198–1201.
30 ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUO MIN FA DIAN SHI YI JI SHI YONG ZHI NAN
(中华人民共和国民法典释义及适用指南) [GUIDES ON THE ILLUSTRATION OF CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATION OF THE CHINESE CIVIL CODE] 1980 (Huang Wei ed., 2020) [hereinafter
CHINESE CIVIL CODE GUIDE].
31 Wang Liming (王利明), Lun Shouhai Ren Zigan Maoxian (论受害人自甘冒险) [On
Victim’s Voluntary Assumption of Risk], 2 BIJIAO FA YANJIU (比较法研究) [COMP. L.
REV.] 4 (2019). See also Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), Qinquan Zeren Bian: Zai Chengji Zhong
Wanshan he Chuangxin (侵权责任编：在承继中完善和创新) [Tort Liability in the Civil
Code: Perfection and Innovation in Inheritance], 4 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINA
LEGAL SCI.] 109 (2020).
32 Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), supra note 31.
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not clarify to what extent Article 1176 would apply in the assessment of an organizer’s performance of its duty of safety protection.33 This raises issues when Article 1176’s provisions overlap with other provisions, e.g., Article 1198, especially
when considering the different rationales underlying the relevant provisions.
While Article 1176 does not distinguish between competitive sports and mass
sports, Articles 1198–1201 (and their predecessor, Article 37) clearly state that
they are meant to regulate organizers of mass sports, not those of professional
sports.34 The rationale is that in contrast with professional players, amateur players lack knowledge of and experience with injury prevention, rescue measures to
adopt should the need arise, and the resources necessary to address emergencies
and injuries. Imposing a special duty on organizers is therefore viewed as a necessary legal tool to protect the legitimate interests of the participants in amateur
events.35 In addition to regulating the organizers of mass activities, Article 1198
regulates another category of persons, namely the managers or operators of venues where mass activities are conducted.36 A duty of safety protection is imposed
on this category of persons due to the commercial nature of these types of activities. That is, as these persons benefit financially from organizing such events, it is
only fair for them to bear the corresponding legal obligations.
The purpose of Article 1176 is different. It aims to encourage the public to
participate in sports or cultural activities that carry certain risks and to promote
citizens’ autonomy by limiting their exposure to the potential liabilities associated
with such activities.37 Further, as Article 1176 does not specify whether the sports
events it regulates are organized or not, it can be applied irrespective of that detail.38 Therefore, both Articles 1176 and 1198 apply to sports or recreational activities that are viewed as “carrying certain risk,” involve numerous participants,
and are organized or held in commercial or public venues run by organizers.
One scholar argues that the stipulation in Article 1176(2) that “organizers’ duty must
apply Article 1198–1201” excludes Article 1176 as a defense available to organizers. Yang
Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21, at 111. The authors disagree, for two main reasons. First, it
is clearly stipulated in Articles 1199–1201 that these provisions address only kindergartens’ and other educational institutions’ liability when students with limited or no civil
capacity of conduct sustain injuries at school; they are not general clauses that address
organizers’ duty of safety protection. Second, this clause merely states that the law considers an organizer’s duty of safety protection to be relevant in this context in assessing its
liability; it never suggests the exclusion of VAR as a defense available to organizers.
34 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1198.
35 Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua (袁爱华), Lun Qunzhongxing Tiyu Huodong Zuzhizhe De Anquan Baozhang Yiwu Ji Kangbian Shiyou- Yi Kunming Malasong Cansai Zhe
Cusi
An
Wei
Li
(论群众性体育活动组织者的安全保障义务及抗辩事由—
以昆明马拉松参赛者猝死案为例) [On the Organizers’ Duty of Safety Protection in Organizing Mass Sports Events and Defenses – The Case of Kunming Marathon Participant’s
Sudden Death], 17 NEIMENGGU NONGYE DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)
(内蒙古农业大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. INNER MONGOLIA AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI.
EDITION)] 45 (2015).
36 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1198.
37 Yang Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21.
38 Id.
33
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Exemption Clause and Contract Law Issues

In the Zhejiang International Circuit case, the organizer attempted to rely on
the exemption clause to exclude his liability. A factor that complicates the analysis
of organizers’ tortious liability in sports injury claims is that, as standard practice
in the industry, participants in a motor racing event are usually required to sign a
contract with the organizer.39 These contracts often contain clauses that specify
various circumstances under which the organizer is exempt from liability even if
a participant sustains a personal injury or dies. These contracts often include
clauses which exempt the organized when the participant has a health condition
that is likely to affect his ability to control a race car. 40 When the organizers of
sports events include exemption clauses in standard contracts distributed to all
participants, the legitimate concern arises that the terms of these contracts may be
prejudicial to the interests of the participants. According to the Chinese Civil
Code, the exemption clause would be void if it involves acts that cause personal
harm to the other party or cause property damage to the other party intentionally
or in gross negligence.41 The effectiveness of exemption clauses in this context is
not only evaluated in terms of contract law; it may also depend on how organizers’
duties are interpreted in terms of tort law.

II. LEGAL ISSUES IN SPORTS INJURY CLAIMS
Three main legal issues related to sports injury claims are relevant to the
Zhejiang International Circuit case. The first concerns which of three methods of
assigning tortious liability stipulated by the Civil Code applies. These three methods derive from the following principles: a fault-based principle, a strict liability
principle, and a principle allocating liability based on constructive or presumed
fault.42 The second legal issue concerns how to interpret and apply an organizer’s
duty of safety protection. The last issue concerns how this duty interacts with the
application of Article 1176, as under certain circumstances the application of
these two provisions may overlap.

39

A regulation issued by a professional body of the automotive industry specifies that
at organized events, drivers must have a contractual agreement on the exemption of liability. See Zhongguo Qiche Motuoche Yundong Lianhehui Saishi Anquan Shengchan Guanli
Guiding (中国汽车摩托车运动联合会赛事安全生产管理规定) [Regulation Over Safety
Management of Organized Event] (promulgated by China Auto. Sports Union, Sept. 27,
2021, effective Sept. 27, 2021) FENG HUANG WANG HENAN (凤凰网河南) [PHOENIX NET
HENAN], Sept. 29, 2021, at art. 9, http://www.autosports.org.cn/fasc/management/2021/0927/391345.html.
40 See, e.g., ZIC Disclaimer, supra note 12.
41 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 506.
42 Article 1165 of the Civil Code stipulates fault-based liability and liability based on
constructive fault, while Article 1166 of the Code sets out strict liability. Id. at arts. 1165–
66.
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As for the first issue, there is a consensus that the principle of fault-based liability should be adopted in such sports injury claims.43 In deciding how to assign
damages in tortious cases, fault-based liability is the most frequently invoked
principle.44 Fault-based liability is applied in the absence of explicit reference to
constructive fault or strict liability. As neither Article 1176 of the Civil Code nor
provisions in the same code that apply to the organizers of mass activities specifically invoke the application of either constructive fault-based liability or strict
liability, fault-based liability arguably applies under these provisions. 45
As the first legal issue is relatively straightforward, the following sections examine the two more controversial issues: the proper interpretation of an organizer’s duty of safety protection and the potential interaction of this duty with the
application of Article 1176.

A. Organizers’ Duty of Safety Protection in Organizing Mass Sports
Events
i.

Legal Source

The legal source of the duty of safety protection (the duty) consists of statutory
provisions and judicial interpretations that guide courts. In the context of mass
sports events, the duty is governed by Article 1198 of the Civil Code, which stipulates:
The operator or manager of a commercial or public venue such
as [a] hotel, shopping center, bank, station, airport, sports venue,
or entertainment place or the organizer of a mass activity shall
assume the tort liability for any harm caused to another person
as the result of his failure to fulfill the duty of safety protection.
If the harm to another person is caused by a third party, the third
party shall assume the tort liability; and the operator, manager or
organizer, if failing to fulfill the duty of safety protection, shall
assume the corresponding complementary liability. The operator, manager or organizer that has assumed the complementary
liability may claim reimbursement from the third party. 46
This provision clearly anticipates two scenarios. The first is that harm is
caused by a third party. The second is that the harm, while caused by a third party,
is also the fault of the organizer. For example, the organizer may have failed to
prevent the third party’s conduct from causing injury to participants in a mass
43 CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua
(袁爱华), supra note 35.
44 Indeed, one scholar argues that the fault-based principle should be the only principle
adopted in Chinese tort law in allocating liability. CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14.
45 Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua (袁爱华), supra note 35.
46 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1198.
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activity by exercising due care.47 In the second scenario, the manager or organizer
bears “complementary liability” and must compensate the victim fully and seek
recourse against the third party for its share of the damages.
The organizer’s duty is further clarified by the following judicial interpretation:
Where a natural person, legal person or any other organization
who organizes business or social activities, fails to perform he obligation of safety protection and led to personal injury of any other
person, if the victim makes compensation claims against the organizers, the People’s Court shall, within a reasonable scope, support such claims made.48
The “reasonable scope” standard raised by this judicial interpretation has
been a topic of debate among academics hoping to further clarify the standard.
This debate is summarized below.49 However, readers are reminded that (as in
other jurisdictions of civil law) while academic debates play an important role,
the concrete rules are shaped by judicial practice.

ii.

Content of the Duty

The law does not specify the content of organizers’ duty of safety protection,
but one scholar argues that it has two basic aspects—the “hard facility” aspect and
the “software and service” aspect.50 The “hard facility” aspect of the duty requires
organizers to ensure that the facilities and equipment they provide for participants
are safe and that there are sufficient qualified staff present to assist the participants.51 The “software and service” aspect of the duty requires organizers to notify
participants of important matters regarding the mass activities. 52 This includes
proper warnings of risks and, for a dangerous activity attended by numerous participants, the preparation of an emergency alternative or evacuation plan, and the
execution of this plan, should circumstances warrant it.53
The judicial interpretation suggests a restrictive interpretation of the extent of
the duty in its wording “within a reasonable scope.” Scholars express different

47

CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Shiyong
Ruogan
Falv
Wenti
de
Jieshi
(最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation
of the Supreme People’s Court of Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the
Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s
Ct., Dec. 4, 2003, effective May 1, 2004), art. 6, CLI.3.51002 (PKULaw).
49 See discussion infra Section II(A)(ii).
50 Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua (袁爱华), supra note 35.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.; see also Yang Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21, at 116.
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views on how this interpretation limits an organizer’s duty. 54 Various factors are
considered relevant to the interpretation of “reasonable” and thus relevant to a
court’s assessment of an individual organizer’s tortious liability, including the organizer’s professional reputation, financial status, and “way of organizing”
(namely whether the organizer played a minor or major role in organizing the
event).55
In contradistinction, other commentaries posit that “reasonableness” lies in the
assessment of the time, place, and subject of a given scenario and that these three
dimensions define the limits of the duty. 56 Specifically, in terms of the time limitation, it is argued that organizers’ duty should exist only during the mass activity
and the periods immediately before and afterward. 57 Before events, organizers
have the duty of screening the participants’ eligibility to participate. 58 During the
events, they are obliged to assist and take care of participants, to notify them of
relevant matters, and to rescue them should the need arise. Their post-event duties
include evacuating or executing an emergency plan as appropriate.59 In terms of
the venue, “a reasonable scope” suggests that an organizer’s duty is not restricted
to the boundaries of the venue of the mass activity, where their duty is to remove
obstacles that may pose threats to participants’ personal safety. 60 Instead, organizers may be liable even when participants sustain injury adjacent to or reasonably
related to the event venue, depending on the scale and type of event. 61 Finally, as
regards the subject of the event, reasonableness requires that organizers only owe
the duty towards a specific group of persons reasonably related to the mass sports
event, which typically includes participants, coaches and staff. 62
Different views over the scope of organizers’ duty of safety protection highlight the uncertainty involved in assessing this duty. The existence of various possible interpretations of the reasonableness test, the primary purpose of which is to
limit the scope of the duty, complicates the application of the duty. This in turn
54 See, e.g., Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31; Long Zhuhua (龙著华) & Wu
Jinghuang (吴静煌), Lun Qunzhongxing Tiyu Huodong Zuzhi Zhe de Anquan Baozhang
Yiwu (论群众性体育活动组织者的安全保障义务) [On Organizers’ Safety Protection
Duty in Public Sports Activities], 29 GUANGDONG WAIYU WAIMAO DAXUE XUEBAO
(广东外语外贸大学学报) [J. GUANGDONG U. FOREIGN STUD.] 103 (2018).
55 This may introduce a paradox, wherein an organizer’s exercising more control over
an activity increases its duty of safety protection. According to this argument, if organizers
devote more resources to organizing activities, thereby increasing their organizational role,
their duty of safety protection also increases. See Wei Yilin (危羿霖), Huwai Yundong
Renshen Sunhai de Zuzhi Zhe Zeren Chengdan Ji Sifa Rending
(户外运动人身损害的组织者责任承担及司法认定) [Responsibility of the Outdoor
Sports Organizer in Personal Injury Claims and Judicial Cognizance], 33 TIYU CHENGREN
JIAOYU XUEKAN (成人教育学刊) [J. SPORTS ADULT EDUC.] 40 (2017).
56 Long Zhuhua (龙著华) & Wu Jinghuang (吴静煌), supra note 54
57 Id. at 106–08.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 108.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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complicates analysis of the key issue of the Zhejiang International Circuit case,
specifically whether the duty of effective rescue is owed by an organizer of a mass
motor racing sports event to participants in the event.

iii.

Adequate Medical Support as Part of the Duty of Safety
Protection?

For the case in question, discussion of the application of the organizer’s duty
gives rise to a more specific question, namely whether the organizer’s duty of
safety protection includes the provision of adequate medical support and effective
rescue should accidents occur during a mass motor racing activity. This Article
argues that such provisions should be covered by the organizer’s duty of safety
protection. The rationale underlying this argument is presented below with reference to the various approaches adopted in the literature to the interpretation of
“reasonableness.”
An inspection of the literature suggests that the following four main factors
account for the imposition of the duty of safety protection on motor racing activity
organizers: an organizer’s previous conduct created the possibility of participants’
injury; organizers can control the danger associated with such activities to various
degrees; the participants in such organized mass sports events tend to rely on the
organizers for safety protection; and organizers frequently benefit from organizing such mass events.63
The “previous conduct” factor refers to conduct by an organizer in initiating
the mass activity that causes numerous participants to gather in a specific place.
Furthermore, such activities often entail frequent bodily contact and conflict,
which constitute a source of danger and create opportunities for participants to
sustain injury. As it is the organizer’s conduct that generates these threats, it is
reasonable that the organizer be required to adopt measures to prevent the participants from sustaining injury. 64
The argument relating to the second factor is that because the organizer possesses superior professional knowledge of the relevant sports activity and greater
access to resources, as compared with the participants, the organizer better understands the risks involved and is in a better position to adopt safety measures while
planning and organizing the activity to prevent injuries. Compared with the “previous conduct” argument, which focuses on the source of danger, this line of argument focuses more on organizers’ ability to control the danger and factors that
influence this ability.65 Following this line of reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude that the greater an organizer’s ability to control the danger involved in such
an activity, the more extensive the organizer’s duty of safety protection should be.
Arguments relating to the third factor take a different perspective, focusing on
participants’ reasonable reliance on organizers. It is argued that when participants
63

Id.54 See also Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31.
Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31.
65 Long Zhuhua (龙著华) & Wu Jinghuang (吴静煌), supra note 54.
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engage in organized mass sports activities, their conscious self-protection is reduced, as they reasonably rely instead on the organizers of the events and therefore exercise less care than they would if participating in non-organized events.
In other words, they rely on organizers to alert them to safety-related concerns.
Therefore, it is reasonable and imperative for the law to impose a duty of care on
the organizers of such events.66
The fourth factor is associated with the commercial nature of organized mass
sports events. The associated argument posits that because organizers benefit from
such events, it is only fair to impose on them the duty of safety protection and to
require them to bear the cost of adopting appropriate safety measures. 67
The above arguments lend support to the conclusion that the provision of adequate medical support and effective rescue should indeed be included in organizers’ duty of safety protection. According to the “previous conduct” argument, if
organizers did not conduct mass sports events, thus generating a source of danger,
participants would not require medical support or emergency rescue. The “ability
to control the danger” argument points out that organizers are in a better position
than participants to provide safety and rescue services in terms of both experience
and resources, and thus are in a better position to incorporate such services into
the overall arrangement when they organize events. Moreover, the greater the potential danger created by an organizer, and the greater the ability of the organizer
to prevent or control this danger, the more extensive the organizer’s duty should
be. In the context of a mass sports event “that carries certain risk,” the organizer’s
failure to provide adequate medical support and effective rescue would undoubtedly exacerbate the harm suffered by injured participants. Thus, it is reasonable
to construe the organizer’s duty of safety protection as including the timely provision of adequate medical and rescue services for participants. Given the highrisk nature of motor racing activities, the organizer of such an event must have the
capacity to provide such services as are commonly understood to be necessary in
racing practice. This suggests that the organizer cannot claim exemption from liability in the present case.
With respect to the third factor, that of “reasonable reliance,” participants in a
mass sports event reasonably rely on its organizer to provide medical and rescue
services; they would not expect to be warned of insufficient or absent medical
support or rescue plans, like those in the present case. Furthermore, as medical
and rescue services are increasingly perceived as a regular and an integral part of
major mass sports events, participants are unlikely to anticipate that such arrangements will not be provided when deciding whether to engage in such events.68
Finally, as the provision of medical support helps to ensure that mass sports
events run successfully and smoothly, it should be viewed as part of the cost of
66

Id.
Id. at 106.
68 Scholars argue that when dangerous mass sports activities involve numerous participants and complicated procedures, an emergency plan is part of the “software and service”
aspect of the organizer’s duty of safety protection. See Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua
(袁爱华), supra note 35.
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organizing such events. As organizers profit from organizing these events, it is
fair to require them to bear the relevant costs, as with rights come responsibilities.

iv.

Justification with Reference to the Reasonableness Test

It is worth considering the possible relevance of the above debates on “reasonableness” to the duty to provide adequate medical support. One argument concerning reasonableness, as described above, is that organizers are expected to
carry out the duty of safety protection “within a reasonable scope” and that this
scope must depend on organizers’ professional reputation, their financial status,
and the extent of the role they assume (minor or major) in organizing the event. 69
These criteria are used to adjust the scope of a given organizer’s liability according to the individual circumstances of their particular case. None of these factors
affect whether the provision of medical support or effective rescue should be part
of an organizer’s duty of safety protection. However, they may be relevant to a
court’s assessment of the degree to which an organizer is expected to carry out
this specific duty.
Another approach to interpreting “reasonableness” is to qualify the scope of
an organizer’s duty of safety protection as limited by the relevant time, venue, and
subject. This line of reasoning does not exclude the provision of medical or rescue
services from being part of an organizer’s duty of safety protection, as such support is often called for when participants suffer personal injuries either during an
event or immediately before or after the event. Injuries often take place in the
venue where the event is held, and most victims are either participants or people
reasonably related to the event. As the “reasonableness” test is to contain the scope
of organizer’s duty of safety protection, if it is understood to limit the duty by the
relevant time, venue, and subject, it will not exclude provision of adequate medical support as a part of the duty. Thus, the conclusion that the provision of adequate medical support should be part of organizers’ duty of safety protection is
not affected by any of the above arguments regarding the proper interpretation of
“reasonableness.”

B. Article 1176’s Effect on Organizers’ Duty of Safety Protection
The third legal issue relating to sports injury claims is how Article 1176 affects
the application of organizers’ duty of safety protection. To adequately address this
issue, three sub-issues require examination. First, Article 1176 governs “activities
carrying certain risk,” and it is assumed that people engaging in such activities
voluntarily assume such risk. 70 However, several elements of this provision are
not properly defined, leading to ambiguity regarding its proper application. For
instance, “risk” is not defined; it may refer to the risk perceived by participants
when they engage in such sports, the risk inherent to a category of sports or
69
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Wei Yilin (危羿霖), supra note 55.
Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1176.
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cultural activities or simply all risk involved in participating in such activities.
Accordingly, it remains unclear whether Article 1176 presumes that participants
voluntarily assume inherent risks (i.e., risks that people expect to be, or that are,
usually associated with the type of sports or recreational activities in which they
engage), assume all foreseeable risks of engaging in such activities, or assume all
of the risks associated with engaging in these activities.
Second, Article 1176 only exempts participants from liability for torts committed against other participants; it does not address the allocation of liability between the participants and the organizer of an event. While the Civil Code addresses an organizer’s duty of safety protection in other provisions, it fails to
address the relevance of the participants’ conduct to the assessment of organizer’s
negligent liability. This may require courts to rely on their own interpretation of
the law when adjudicating relevant cases, leading to inconsistent rulings.
Third, even if scholars agree that participants’ fault is relevant in assessing
organizers’ duty of safety protection,71 the approach to be adopted by the courts
is unclear. Assuming that participants’ fault can be relied upon as a statutory defense for organizers, a question remains regarding to what extent organizers can
be exempted from liability by relying on this defense. In other words, is a participant’s fault a complete defense that erases all liability on the part of the organizer
or merely a mitigating factor that reduces the organizer’s liability?

i.

Scope of “Risk” and Other Concepts in Article 1176

To determine the scope of risk that participants are presumed to voluntarily
assume under Article 1176, it is necessary to explore the legislative intent of Article 1176. As mentioned above, when introducing Article 1176, it was the Committee’s view that VAR rules should not be widely applied; rather, they should be
limited to “sports or recreational activities that carry certain risk.” 72 Furthermore,
the main purpose of Article 1176 is to encourage people to engage in sports and
recreational activities that carry certain risk by alleviating their concerns about
potential tortious liability.73 Therefore, a broad interpretation of “risk” as referring
to all of the risks entailed in participating in such activities would diverge from
the legislative intent of the law. Further, from the perspective of legislative technique, “risk” could not be construed here as “risk foreseeable by participants”
because it was employed to define “activities.” This leaves the third option,
namely that “risk” in this context refers to the inherent risks incurred by a
71

CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua
(袁爱华), supra note 35.
72 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa He Falv Weiyuanhui Guanyu 《Minfa Dian
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Qingkuang
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Huibao
(全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会关于《民法典侵权责任编（草案）》修改情
况的汇报) [Report on the Revision of the Chapter of Tort Liability in the Civil Code
(Draft)] (promulgated by the Const. & L. Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 23, 2018), ch.
2.
73 Yang Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21, at 112.
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particular type of sports activity, which could reasonably be associated with that
type of activity. In a recent book written by experts who have been involved in
the enactment of the code, “activities carrying certain risk” is explained as “(cultural or sporting activities) that involve[] certain level of risk, demands thresholds
in participating, and of the hostile or competitive nature.”74 This reading is consistent with our viewpoint of “risk” explained above.
Under this interpretation of the scope of risk under Article 1176, it is not presumed that participants, by engaging in risky sports or recreational activities, willingly assume any risks unrelated to those sports or activities themselves. Therefore, the organizers of such events should not be shielded from liability by Article
1176 for injuries resulting from risks posed to participants that are caused by the
organizers’ negligence. In that sense, the application of Article 1176 should not
exclude the application of organizers’ duty of safety protection. Nonetheless,
questions remain. When the inherent risk of such activities is very high, would a
court be justified in imposing on organizers the duty of safety protection to participants in the activity? What would be the nature of their duty? No existing law
addresses these questions explicitly, nor have the courts issued any illuminating
judicial interpretations.
In the case He Xiaofei v. Beijing Mijing Hefeng Technology Co., an internet
platform was deemed to have breached its duty of safety protection. 75 The court
commented that, by allowing a participant to upload and share a video of himself
climbing high-rise buildings, the platform encouraged similar dangerous activity,
increasing the “risk” and danger posed to the participant, and the platform was
therefore liable for the participant’s injuries. 76 The authors of this article disagree
with the court’s interpretation of “risk” in this case. We are of the view that the
risks inherent to the climbing activity were neither amplified nor reduced by the
platform’s conduct. Hence, the VAR ground should not be invoked at all.
The above analysis shows that Article 1176, as it is worded, falls short of
establishing the legal elements that would constitute participants’ VAR, by including terms such as “harm must result from risks inherent to these activities” or
“provision to be invoked only by participants in these activities,” thereby creating
uncertainty over the legal effect of applying this provision.77 Another recent case
is illustrative. This case involved an elderly woman who crossed a university basketball court during a student competition and sustained an injury when she was
knocked down by one of the players.78 She sued both the player and the university,
74

CHINESE CIVIL CODE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 1937.
He Xiaofei Su Beijing Mijinghefeng Keji Youxian Gongsi Wangluo Qinquan Zeren
Jiufen Anjian (何小飞诉北京密境和风科技有限公司网络侵权责任纠纷案件) [He
Xiaofei v. Beijing Mijing Hefeng Technology Co.], PKULaw (Beijing 4th Internet Ct.
2019).
76 Id. Note that this case was decided before Article 1176 was enacted.
77 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1176.
78 Laotai Hengchuang Bisai Zhong de Lanqiuchang Bei Zhuangshang Hou Qisu Suopei; Wuhan Zhongyuan: Laotai Zigan Maoxian Ying Zixing Chengdan Sunhai Houguo (老
太横穿比赛中的篮球场被撞伤后起诉索赔; 武汉中院：老太自甘冒险应自行承担损
害后果) [Hubei Wuhan City Intermediate People’s Court Comments that Old Lady
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which was the operator of the basketball court. The court ruled that the university
had exercised due care by painting the court a color that was sufficiently distinguishable from walkways at the university and had drawn lines sufficiently noticeable to pedestrians, thus fulfilling its duty of safety protection.79 Furthermore,
the court held that the plaintiff should be perceived to have “voluntarily assumed
the risk” when she crossed the court where an activity “carrying certain risk” was
being conducted.80 However, a close examination reveals that Article 1176 should
not have been invoked, as it applies to tortious claims arising from injuries sustained by participants in certain activities involving inherent risks; the plaintiff
did not belong to this category. The plaintiff’s case could have been resolved by
applying the general principles of tort law in assessing the fault-based liability of
the organizer, thereby avoiding the invocation of Article 1176.

ii.

Participants’ Fault in Assessing Organizers’ Duty of Safety
Protection

In terms of the second legal issue at hand—whether courts should factor participants’ fault, or the absence of it, into their assessment of organizers’ duty of
safety protection—we look to the principle that courts adopt in applying the duty.
As discussed above, the principle adopted to allocate tortious liability in this context is fault-based.81 This suggests that the fault of participants is relevant to the
allocation of liability between organizers and participants. However, it must be
emphasized that the mere fact of engaging in recreational or sports activities that
carry certain risks is not perceived as constituting “fault” on the part of the participants. As long as the participants’ conduct does not contribute to the occurrence
or degree of harm caused to them by the organizers, their voluntary participation
in the activities neither exempts the organizers from the duty of safety protection
nor mitigates this duty. Only in circumstances where participants negligently contribute to the harm done to them, by disregarding warnings, disobeying instructions given by the organizers, or similar behavior, is the liability shared between
organizers and participants.
This raises a further question. When allocating liability between participants and organizers in the context of these types of activities, does this context
affect the fault-based liability assessment on either or both sides? In 2021, in the
first case applying Article 1176 as a VAR defense, the court cautioned that because of the intense nature of the sports activity in question, the duty of care imposed on participants who caused injury to other participants should not be too
Voluntarily Assumes the Risk when Crossing Basketball Court During the Game], REN MIN
FA YUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S CT. DAILY] (May 19, 2021), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2021-05/19/03/2021051903_pdf [hereinafter VAR Basketball
Crossing].
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua
(袁爱华), supra note 35.
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demanding and that, in that context, their conduct should be held to a more relaxed
standard of “sports ethics and rules.” 82 However, conduct should be considered
“grossly negligent” if it violates the rules of the game.83 This suggests that the
court imposed a stricter duty of care on victim participants who chose to engage
in more dangerous cultural or recreational activities. However, this case did not
involve the event’s organizer, and the issue of whether negligence or gross negligence precludes organizers from relying on the VAR defense has not yet been
addressed in the courts.

C. Article 1176 Defense: Partial Exemption or Complete Exemption?
The final sub-issue concerns whether organizers may invoke Article 1176 as a
complete defense against liability or only as a mitigating factor. A survey conducted in 2019 reveals that the term “voluntary assumption of risk” had been in
use by Chinese courts in sports injury cases for some time before Article 1176
was enacted.84 The author of the study identified 131 judgments referencing VAR
and found that in most cases (125 out of 131) the court used the plaintiff’s VAR
as a basis for proportionately reducing the organizer’s liability, instead of treating
it as an independent ground for a possible complete exemption. 85 One wonders
whether courts would adopt a similar approach when applying Article 1176 in
assessing an organizer’s duty.
While Professor Zhang Xinbao points out that Article 1176 was added as a
new category of statutory defense for tort cases, suggesting that it should be applied in a manner similar to statutory defenses under Article 1173 (contributory
negligence) or 1174 of the Civil Code (implicit consent), 86 this argument fails for
two reasons. First, as compared with the general nature of the defenses stipulated
by Articles 1173 and 1174,87 the statutory defense under Article 1176 as it is currently drafted is limited: it only addresses tortious liability among participants in
a mass event. While it is clear that participants can invoke this defense, it is unclear whether organizers or other non-participant defendants in the same case can
invoke it. Second, an organizer defendant invoking the defense under Article 1176
82
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(宋邦祯与周君生命权、身体权、健康权纠纷一案二审民事判决书) [Civil Judgment
Between Song Bangzhen and Zhou Jun Regarding Disputes over Right to Life, Health and
Bodily Integrity], PKULaw (Beijing 3d Internet Ct. 2021) [hereinafter Song v. Zhou].
83 Id.
84 Zhou Xiaochen (周晓晨), supra note 27.
85 Id. Only in two cases (out of 131) did the court treat the victim’s voluntary assumption of risk as legal grounds to completely exempt the organizer from liability. Id.
86 Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), supra note 31.
87 Article 1173 of the Civil Code states that “[w]here the victim of a tort is at fault as
to the occurrence or aggravation of the same harm, the liability of the tortfeasor may be
mitigated.” Article 1174 of the Code stipulates that “[t]he actor shall not be liable for any
harm that is caused intentionally by the victim.” Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at arts.
1173–74.
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against a participant plaintiff would be required to raise it either as a contributory
negligence defense as stipulated by Article 1173 or as a complete exemption under Article 1174. The distinction between these two approaches is the exact focus
of the longstanding academic debate surrounding the VAR defense in the Chinese
context, a debate that predates Article 1176.88
It is necessary to examine this debate not only because it sheds light on the
proper application of Article 1176 and VAR, but also because in the Chinese context, although legal sources do not include legal theory, legal theory may be applied in the reasoning of courts. This means that this debate may influence courts’
conceptual understanding of VAR as a legal ground for defense, as reflected in
their reasoning in relevant judgments. 89 The following section introduces the debate and discusses whether the conceptual understanding of VAR underpinning
this debate can be appropriately applied to Article 1176.

i.

The Academic Debate

The debate centered around whether VAR shall be treated as a mitigating factor and be applied via a “contributory negligence” approach in affecting the allocation of tortuous liability between participants and organizers, or as grounds for
complete exemption from liability, whereby the victim’s VAR was interpreted as
their implicit consent to incur risk, a statutory defense now codified in Article
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CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31.
Courts may quote legal theory to strengthen their analysis in judgments, according
to a notice issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2018:
Besides the provisions of laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations,
judges may justify ratio decidendi by the following arguments, in order to
improve the legitimacy and acceptability of adjudicative conclusions: guiding cases issued by the Supreme People’s Court . . .; legal principles and
generally accepted academic views and other arguments not in conflict with
regulatory and legal documents such as laws and judicial interpretations.
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DE
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DE
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2018), art. 13, PKULaw [hereinafter NOTICE OF ANALYSIS]. See also Zhang Xinbao (张新
宝), supra note 31, at 121. According to Zhang, scholars’ opinions on specific issues in
tort law have influenced, directly or indirectly, the enaction of the chapter on tortious liability in the Chinese Civil Code. See also Peng Zhong Li (彭中礼), Lun Falv Xueshuo de
Sifa Yunyong (论法律学说的司法运用) [On the Judicial Application of Legal Theory], 4
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [SOC. SCI. CHINA] 90, 90 (2020) (noting that
“though the opinion mentioned that judges could apply ‘legal principles and generally accepted academic views,’ these terms are not strictly speaking legal concepts and the status
and nature of legal theory in fact were not specified under the Chinese legal system.”).
89
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1174 of the Civil Code.90 It is worth emphasizing that the effect of Article 1174
is to fully exempt the tortfeasor from liability, as it provides that when a person
has full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risks he assumes he implicitly
agrees to incur such risks, and the tortfeasor is therefore not liable for any harm
to the person.91 Ultimately, the debate was settled, and a consensus was reached
that VAR as a general defense does not entail implicit consent to incur risk. 92
Instead, it should be treated as a mitigating factor and applied via a contributory
negligence approach, as stipulated by Article 1173 of the Civil Code as, “[w]here
the victim of a tort is at fault as to the occurrence or aggravation of the same harm,
the liability of the tortfeasor may be mitigated.”93
The scholarly argument that VAR should not lead to a complete exemption is
based on the following reasoning. 94 When engaging in these types of dangerous
activities, participants are aware only that there is some level of risk; they have
no knowledge of the full extent of the risks involved. A participant may not be
aware in advance of the specific risk that could lead to injury or the exact extent
of possible injury. In this regard, the victim cannot be viewed as having implicitly
consented to bear the risk, as such consent would require full knowledge of the
nature and extent of such risk and harm. Therefore, a complete defense is not
applicable in this context.95
However, this line of reasoning, focusing on whether participants could have
foreseen certain risks when deciding whether to participate in the activity, ignores
the specific risks that materialize and lead to injury in a concrete case scenario.
This approach also fails to account for how the courts may distinguish risks when
performing a risk-related analysis, as such distinction and analysis is the key to
properly allocating liability between organizers and participants. Moreover, if the
specific risk that materializes has been mentioned and sufficiently detailed in a
signed waiver indicating that the participants acknowledged this risk in advance,
it could be argued that a full exemption should be granted to the organizer.

90 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1174. Article 37 of the Tort Law of People’s
Republic of China is viewed as its predecessor. Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), supra note 31.
91 Letang v Ottawa Electric Ry. Co. [1926] S.C.R. (Can.). See also Wang Liming (王
利明), supra note 31.
92 CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31,
at 4, 9.
93 Chinese Civil Code, supra note 3, at art. 1173.
94 CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31.
In his article, Wang comments on the drafted provision of VAR (Article 973 in the second
draft of the Chinese Civil Code, not Article 1176), in which the wording “dangerous activities” was still used. Wang argues that the VAR defense must be applied according to the
specific context and that the legal effect of VAR—specifically, whether it is treated as a
complete exemption or a mitigating factor—very much depends on that context. The authors are in complete agreement with this opinion. As the term “dangerous activities” was
ultimately replaced with “activities that carry certain risk” in Article 1176 and it was the
legislative intent to limit the VAR defense to this very specific context, it is reasonable to
assume that the defense is intended to grant a complete exemption.
95 CHENG XIAO (程啸), supra note 14. See also Wang Liming (王利明), supra note 31.
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VAR in the Context of Article 1176 Application

It may be a mistake to assume that Article 1176 should be applied via the
approach of contributory negligence, the same way courts used to apply VAR
ground in sports injury claims before Article 1176 was enacted, for three main
reasons. First, Article 1176 is not a general defense of VAR, as it applies to a
particular context. As the Committee chose, when drafting Article 1176, the narrower subject of “sports, social and cultural activities that carry certain risk,” rather than the broader “dangerous activities,” it is evident that the legislative intent
was to limit the application of the VAR defense under the law. Therefore, the
interpretation of Article 1176 must follow the same logic. 96 Intended to be applied
in the context of injury claims resulting from highly dangerous sports activities,
Article 1176’s VAR defense was mainly designed to allocate liability arising from
losses when the “inherent risk” of these types of dangerous activities has materialized and caused harm to participants, not necessarily due to the fault of any
party. It is meant to strike a balance among stakeholders’ interests should injury
occur.97
Second, as discussed above, the interpretation of “risk” under Article 1176
refers to the inherent risks of such activities governed by the article when accounting for the legislative intent. In circumstances where such inherent risks materialize and cause harm to participants in an organized sports activity, even though the
organizer has fulfilled its duty of safety protection, it is reasonable to allow the
organizer to invoke Article 1176 to claim complete exemption from tortious liability. When the inherent risk of a certain activity is high and frequently leads to
injury or when participants’ grossly negligent conduct contributes to their harm,
organizers should be given a reasonable opportunity to claim full exemption from
liability.98
Third, as argued above, fault-based liability applies in cases assessing an organizer’s duty of safety protection, which means that any negligence on the part
of an organizer will affect the allocation of liability between a participant and the
96 See Yang Lixin (杨立新) & She Mengqing (佘孟卿), Minfa Dian Guiding de Zigan
Maoxian Guize Ji Qi Shiyong (民法典》规定的自甘风险规则及其适用) [Voluntary Assumption of Risk Rules and Application in the Civil Code], 4 HENAN CAIJING ZHENGFA
DAXUE XUEBAO (河南财经政法大学学报) [J. HENAN U. ECON. & L.] 1 (2020).
97 In another article on the same topic, Yang points out that the limitation of the Chinese
version of the VAR defense is its failure to strike a proper balance between safeguarding
participants’ autonomy and personal safety and protecting organizers’ rights and interests
in organizing events. See Yang Lixin (杨立新), supra note 21.
98 See He Xiaofei Su Beijing Mijinghefeng Keji Youxian Gongsi Wangluo Qinquan
Zeren Jiufen Anjian (何小飞诉北京密境和风科技有限公司网络侵权责任纠纷案件)
[He Xiaofei v. Beijing Mijing Hefeng Technology Co.], PKULaw (Beijing 4th Internet Ct.
2019). It is the authors’ opinion that the platform should not bear any liability, as its duty
of safety protection should not extend to protecting participants’ personal safety, nor does
the platform have the capacity to prevent any injury that is a materialization of the risk that
is inherently associated with climbing high-rise buildings. The authors thus disagree with
the court’s ruling on this point.
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organizer. Thus, before the enactment of Article 1176, it was expected that faultbased assessment would apply via Article 1173’s approach of contributory negligence, meaning that negligence on the part of participants would mitigate the liability of the organizer. This raises the question of why types of activities that carry
certain risk were singled out to be regulated by Article 1176. A systemic interpretation of the Civil Code is that Article 1176 should be construed as carving out a
statutory defense for organizers in the unique context of highly dangerous activities. By granting organizers full exemption from liability should circumstances
warrant it, the provision is designed to provide greater autonomy for people who
choose to engage in these activities, to facilitate the development of the industry
by removing some of the disincentives encountered by organizers, and to balance
the interests of various stakeholders.
A close inspection of court opinions reveals that scholars’ conceptual understanding of the VAR defense continues to influence the courts. As the courts tend
to apply VAR grounds via the contributory negligence approach, treating VAR as
a mitigating factor instead of a complete defense, this creates a strong possibility
that Article 1176 will be misapplied by the courts. 99 This would also cause the
“fault-based” principle to be skewed in those cases. As discussed above, courts
adopt the fault-based principle when allocating liability between organizers and
participants and consider both sides’ fault to be relevant. As the current version
of Article 1176 does not clearly set out all of the legal elements required to establish this defense, but only mentions “participants engaging in these activities,” the
courts construe participants’ mere involvement in dangerous mass sport activities
as their “fault” and thus as a universally applicable factor mitigating organizers’
tortious liability.100 This was found when the authors reviewed several sports
99 For the influence of scholars on the courts, see NOTICE OF ANALYSIS, supra note 89,
at art. 13. See also Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), supra note 31; Peng Zhong Li (彭中礼), supra
note 89.
100 The courts seem to have viewed participation in this type of sport as entailing voluntary assumption of the risks involved, without further discussion of associated factors
such as the scope of the risks or aspects of participants’ individual backgrounds that might
affect their ability to assess the concrete risk, instead treating it as a universally applicable
mitigating factor in assessing organizers’ tortious liability. See Zhou Jingying Yu Shanghai
Guoji Saiche Chang Jingying Fazhan Youxian Gongsi Weifan Anquan Baozhang Yiwu
Zeren
Jiufen
Yishen
Minshi
Panjueshu
(周菁颖与上海国际赛车场经营发展有限公司违反安全保障义务责任纠纷一审民事
判决书) [Civil Judgment of First Instance Case Between Zhou Jing Ying and Shanghai
International Circuit Management Development Co. Regarding Disputes over Liability
Arising from Breach of Duty of Safety Protection], PKULaw (Shanghai Jiading Dist. People’s Ct. 2020) [hereinafter Zhou v. Shanghai]; Yin Jia Su Shanghai Quyang Saiche Julebu
Youxian Gongsi Shengming Quan、Jiankang Quan、Shenti Quan Jiufen Shangsu Minshi
Panjueshu
(尹甲诉上海曲阳赛车俱乐部有限公司生命权、健康权、
身体权纠纷上诉案民事判决书) [Civil Judgment of Appellate Case Between Yin Jia and
Shanghai Quyang Racing Club Co. Regarding Disputes Over Right to Life, Health and
Bodily Integrity], PKULaw (Shanghai 2nd Internet People’s Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Yin v.
Shanghai]; Qiaobin Yu Shanghai Lisheng Saiche Wenhua Gufen Youxian Gongsi
Songjiang Fen Gongsi Shanghai Lisheng Saiche Wenhua Gufen Youxian Gongsi
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injury cases to examine how courts have applied the VAR defense in the context
of motor racing activities. Although these cases were decided before Article 1176
was enacted, if such an approach were adopted in applying Article 1176’s VAR
grounds, it would frustrate the Article’s legislative intent. The drafters of Article
1176 made it clear that this provision aims to encourage people to participate in
such activities by alleviating their concerns about potential exposure to tortious
liability. To assume fault for mere participation would undermine this goal.
However, treating Article 1176 as a complete defense for organizers would also
generate problems. To do so would risk subjecting Article 1176 to abuse by organizers attempting to evade their legal obligations. Thus, organizers should be
permitted to rely on Article 1176’s VAR defense for a full exemption, but the law
should be amended to specify the legal elements required to invoke this statutory
defense to avoid confusion about and abuse of the law.

III. AUSTRALIAN POSITION
The development of a country’s laws depends partly on how much experience
it can draw from other jurisdictions. 101 There are two good reasons for China to
draw on Australian tort law to inform its own laws. First, Australian tort law is a
hybrid of public and private law. 102 Australian tort law and Chinese tort law show
similarities in terms of this public-private divide. For example, they both protect
the right of race car drivers to participate in competitions in a safe environment
while holding motorsports organizers responsible for fulfilling certain duties to
ensure such an environment, which derives from a private law perspective. 103
They also both apply public law reasoning in facilitating the stable development

Shengming Quan、Jiankang Quan、Shenti Quan Jiufen Shangsu Minshi Panjueshu
(乔斌与上海力盛赛车文化股份有限公司松江分公司、上海力盛赛车文化股份有限
公司生命权、健康权、身体权纠纷一案民事判决书) [Civil Judgment of First Instance
Case Between Qiao Bin and Shanghai Lisheng Racing Culture Co., Songjiang Branch and
Shanghai Lisheng Racing Culture Co. Regarding Disputes Over Right to Life, Health and
Bodily Integrity], PKULaw (Shanghai Songjiang Dist. Ct. 2020) [hereinafter Qiao v.
Shanghai]; Ye Weijian Su Foshan Shi Sanshui Senlin Saiche Julebu Youxian Gongsi Weifan
Anquan
Baozhang
Yiwu
Zeren
Jiufen
An
(叶伟健诉佛山市三水森林赛车俱乐部有限公司违反安全保障义务责任纠纷案件)
[Case between Ye Weijian and Foshan Sanshui Forest Racing Club Co. Regarding Disputes over Liability arising from Breach of Duty of Safety Protection], PKULaw (Sanshui
Dist. Ct., Foshan City, Guangdong Prov. 2016) [hereinafter Ye v. Foshan]. For arguments
against perceiving participation as “fault,” see Yang Lixin (杨立新) & She Mengqing
(佘孟卿), supra note 96.
101 Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 671 (2002); H. Patrick Glenn, Against
Method, in THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
MARK VAN HOECKE 177 (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014).
102 HAROLD LUNTZ ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY 144–45 (7th ed. 2013).
103 Deng Rui (邓蕊) & Yuan Aihua (袁爱华), supra note 35; LUNTZ ET AL., supra note
102, at 365–66.
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of the sports industry and taking measures to combat public liability crises.104 Second, Chinese legislators and scholars extensively reference Australian tort law
commentaries and cases when discussing the content and application of the duty
of care.105 It is, therefore, argued that the Chinese concept of negligence shares a
similar origin to its counterpart in Australian law.
These similarities pave the way for Chinese lawmakers to draw wisdom from
Australia’s tort law development. The authors do not advocate simply replicating
Australian tort law; rather, we aim to show how Australian courts and the Australian government analyze organizers’ duty of care in the context of motorsports
activities; to understand the rationales underpinning such analyses; and to incorporate the resulting insights into the analysis and development of Chinese tort law.

A. Duty of Care
i.

Common Law Source

In the early 2000s, Australia’s courts tended to “award large sums in damages
in negligence suits and [give] little regard to the personal responsibility of plaintiffs.”106 This engendered critical debate on implementing tort reforms to “restore
sense and balance in the law of negligence” 107 in Australia. In response to this
debate and the insurance crisis of 2002,108 the federal and state governments
formed a Panel of Eminent Persons,109 chaired by Justice David Ipp (the Ipp
Panel), to undertake a “Principles-based Review of the Law of Negligence.” 110
This panel was instructed to “examine a method for the reform of the common
law with the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from
personal death and injury.”111 This review resulted in broad tort reforms in states
104

Stewart v Ackland [2015] ACTCA 1, ¶ 128. The Premier of New South Wales predicted that after the bill passed, “personal responsibility [would] rightly assume a much
higher profile . . . . [T]here [would] be no duty to warn of an obvious risk, providing that
no written law requires such a warning in the particular case. Nor [would] there be any
liability for the obvious risks of particularly dangerous sports and other risky activities.”
Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW).
105 Paula Giliker, Comparative Law and Legal Culture: Placing Vicarious Liability in
Comparative Perspective, 6 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 265, 288–91 (2018).
106 Gabriel Perry, Obvious Risks of Dangerous Recreational Activities: How Is Risk
Defined for Civil Liability Act Purposes?, 23 TORTS L.J. 56, 58 (2016).
107 David Thorpe & Leanne Houston, Game Changer? Professional Sport and Dangerous Recreational Activity: Revisiting the Ruling in Dodge v Snell, 11 AUSTL. & N.Z.
SPORTS L.J. 75, 77 (2016).
108 An important public liability insurer collapsed in 2002, and at the same time, other
such insurers turned their backs on the Australian market. These events resulted in an increase in third-party insurance premiums and difficulties for certain recreational service
providers, such as sporting clubs, in obtaining insurance coverage. Perry, supra note 106.
109 Thorpe & Houston, supra note 107.
110 PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONS, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, REVIEW OF THE LAW
OF NEGLIGENCE: FINAL REPORT ix (2002).
111 Id.
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such as New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania. The Civil Liability Act
that was accordingly promulgated plays an essential role in addressing negligence
in Australia, for example, by the “reduction of contributory negligence from a
complete defense to a ground for apportionment” 112 and the introduction of the
defense of dangerous recreational activity (DRA defense).
Unfortunately, however, these new laws do not provide a comprehensive definition of the duty of care. Although the Civil Liability Act, as adopted by New
South Wales, has provisions addressing the duty of care, none of them explicitly
describe the scenarios in which the duty of care may arise, the scope of this duty,
or the criteria for assessing its breach.113 As Judge Leeming observed in Goode v
Angland: “The Civil Liability Act uses language in potentially deceptive ways.
One example is ‘negligence’, which does not mean the tort, and can include
causes of action in contract, equity and under statute.” 114
This indicates that when exploring motorsports organizers’ duty of care under
Australian law, one should focus primarily on case law. The common law requirement of the duty of care as a prerequisite for negligence claims continues to apply,
and the principles upon which such a duty was established are those developed
under case law.115 Three elements are generally examined regarding the duty of
care in the context of Australian law, namely: (a) the existence of a duty of care,
(b) the content or scope of the duty, and (c) the breach of the duty. 116 The Australian cases adjudicated to date have widely upheld that motorsports organizers
owe motorists a common duty of care, such as by establishing appropriate safety
barriers on a racing circuit. 117 In view of the material facts of the present case,
which are summarized in the introduction, the main question at issue is whether
motor race organizers have a duty to guarantee that “all reasonable steps [are]
taken to ensure that [racing drivers receive immediate and effective medical and
[rescue] treatment should [they] sustain injury at the race.” 118 This question concerns the particular content of an organizer’s duty of care. 119

ii.

Particular Content of the Duty of Care

As noted above, Chinese scholars and practitioners have reached no consensus
as to whether motorsports organizers have a duty to provide immediate and
112

LUNTZ, ET AL., supra note 102, at 149.
See Joachim Dietrich, Duty of Care Under the ‘Civil Liability Acts’, 13 TORTS L.J.
17 (2005).
114 Goode v Angland [2017] NSWCA 311, ¶ 205 (emphasis added) (citing Paul v Cooke
[2012] NSWSC 840, ¶¶ 40–41).
115 See Dietrich, supra note 113, at 25.
116 LUNTZ ET AL., supra note 102, at 142.
117 Wattleworth v Goodwood Road Racing Co. (2004) EWHC 140.
118 Id. ¶ 114.
119 In Roads & Traffic Auth. of NSW v. Dederer, Judge Gummow asserted that “duties
of care are not owed in the abstract. Rather, they are obligations of a particular scope, and
that scope may be more or less expansive depending on the relationship in question.” Roads
& Traffic Auth. of NSW v Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, ¶ 43.
113
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effective medical and rescue services for injured motorists and, if so, how this
duty is properly performed. In Australia, this is also the subject of many academic
and judicial writings; it involves an evaluative judgment that entails “normative
considerations as to the appropriateness of the imputation of legal responsibilities”120 on the parties to motor racing. Upon closer inspection of Australian case
law, it is not difficult to conclude that motorsports organizers should be subject to
the particular content of the duty of care, i.e., to provide medical assistance and
rescue services as needed.
In motor racing activities, racing drivers’ “physical safety becomes dependent
upon the acts or commissions of” 121 the organizer. Organizers have a high level
of control over the provision of medical care. Their unreasonable failure to provide such care results in “foreseeable risks of personal injury” 122 to motorists for
four main reasons. First, the organizers of such races explicitly state their commitment to safeguarding motorists’ physical safety. Second, participation in motor race activities inevitably incurs the risk of “physical injury and the need for
medical precautions against the consequences of such injury.”123 Third, the organizer of such an event controls the medical assistance provided and has “access to
specialist expertise in relation to appropriate standards of medical care.”124 Fourth,
an organizer’s assumption of responsibility with respect to medical care may lead
to motorists’ reasonable belief that they can rely on the organizer to look after
their physical safety. In view of these four considerations, it is foreseeable, “in the
sense of a real and not far-fetched possibility,”125 that an organizer’s careless act
or omission (failure to provide immediate and effective medical treatment when
a motorist sustains an injury at a race) may result in physical injury to motorists. 126
Following this line of thought, motorists’ physical safety may be “closely and
directly affected”127 by a careless act or omission by the organizer regarding a
matter that the organizer should reasonably have had “in contemplation.” 128 The
reasonable foreseeability of physical injury, in conjunction with the proximate
relationship between organizers and motorists, points to the particular duty of care
to provide such medical and rescue services on the part of motorsports organizers.

B. Defenses Available to Motorsports Organizers
Given the complete control that motor racing organizers hold over the provision of immediate medical treatment to motorists, 129 it is not difficult to establish

120

LUNTZ ET AL., supra note 102, at 114.
Watson v. British Boxing Bd. of Control Ltd. [2001] QB 1134 at 1151 (Eng.).
122 Perrett v. Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 255, 261 (Eng.).
123 Watson, [2001] QB at 1162–63.
124 Id. at 1163.
125 Sullivan v Moody [2001] 183 ALR 404, 412 (Austl.).
126 Chapman v Hearse [1961] 106 CLR 112, 120–21 (Austl.).
127 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (Eng.).
128 Id.
129 See discussion supra Section III(A).
121
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actual causation.130 This means that the physical damage suffered by an injured
motorist would not have been so severe but for the organizer’s negligent act (i.e.,
failure to provide immediate rescue and medical support). For example, given the
material facts of the present case, it could be argued that if the organizer had provided immediate and effective rescue and medical services to the injured motorist,
the degree of physical injury suffered by the motorist might not have been as serious as death.
Having established a breach of a duty of care, the next question to be considered is whether the organizer can assert certain defenses against the motorist’s
claim of negligence. Australian tort law provides two defenses for an organizer in
cases such as the present case, namely: (a) the defense of dangerous recreational
activity (the DRA defense), which is a statutory defense under the Civil Liability
Act, and (b) the defense of voluntary assumption of risk (the VAR defense), which
is a common law defense with origins that can be traced back to the 19th century.131
The following section outlines the operative mechanism of each defense and the
extent to which each defense can mitigate the liabilities that motorsports organizers are exposed to.

i.

DRA Defense

The first defense available to motor racing organizers under Australian tort
law is the DRA defense. Created by legislators in response to the public liability
crisis, this defense permits injured persons to be presumed to be aware of obvious
risks under common law132 and exempts organizers from liability for harm to participants arising from the obvious risks of dangerous recreational activities. 133 The
DRA defense is a complete defense, which means that it prohibits an injured motorist from claiming damages from a motor race organizer, even if the motorist’s
physical harm was caused by the organizer’s negligent conduct or omission. 134
The DRA defense requires that three components be present.135 First, the motorist
must have been engaged in a “recreational activity.” Second, this activity must
130

Zanner v Zanner [2010] NSWCA 343, ¶ 11 (Austl.).
LUNTZ ET AL., supra note 102.
132 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) sch 3; Civil Liability Act 2002
(N.S.W.) s 5G; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Queensl.) s 14; Civil Liability Act 1936 (S. Austl.)
s 37; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas.) s 16; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vict.) s 54; Civil Liability Act
2002 (W. Austl.) s 5N. Note that the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act of the Australian Capital
Territory deals only with obvious risks in the instance of equine activities. Civil Law
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) sch 3. The Northern Territory legislation is silent on
the issue.
133 Civil Liability Act 2002 (N.S.W.) s 5L; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Queensl.) s 15;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas.) s 20; Civil Liability Act 2002 (W. Austl.) s 5H. In South
Australia, torts relating to recreational activities are addressed via various processes. Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (S. Austl.). All other jurisdictions are
silent on the issue.
134 See Perry, supra note 106.
135 Id. at 57–59.
131
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have been a “dangerous” recreational activity. Third, the harm suffered by the
motorist must have resulted from the materialization of an obvious risk associated
with the dangerous recreational activity. Dispute as to the scope and operation of
this defense persists, and the courts are inconsistent in their interpretation of these
three components.

a. Scope of “Recreational Activity”
The Civil Liability Act defines “recreational activity” broadly, as: (a) any
sport; (b) any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure;
or (c) any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place where people ordinarily engage
in sport or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. 136 Despite
this broad description, it is debatable whether professional (as opposed to amateur) motor racing activities fall within the scope of “recreational activity.” This
point is well illustrated by comparing the decisions in Goode v Angland137 and
Dodge v Snell.138 Both cases involved professional jockeys who were injured
when their mounts fell on the track during a race. However, the Supreme Court of
New South Wales (NSW) and the Supreme Court of Tasmania delivered inconsistent judgments despite applying identical legal provisions. The reasoning for
the two judgments was considerably at odds. The fundamental divergence lay in
whether horse riding can be classified as a “recreational activity.”
Judge Wood in Dodge v Snell defined the scope of “recreational activity” narrowly, stating that the term refers to activities that are “recreational” and does not
“extend to activities carried out in the course of employment or occupation.” 139
According to Wood, “[t]he word ‘recreational’ imparts meaning to the word
‘sport’”;140 therefore, horse racing, as a professional activity, does not fall within
the definition of “recreational activity” due to its lack of a recreational element.
Following his reasoning, those who negligently harm another in a professional
sports context are “exposed to civil liability.”141 In contradistinction, in Goode v
Angland, Judge Harrison found that the physical harm caused to plaintiff Mr.
Goode was the materialization of an obvious risk associated with a dangerous
recreational activity and, accordingly, that the DRA defense could be invoked to
“exclude Mr. Angland’s liability.” 142 In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Harrison focused on the usage of the phrase “any sport” in the definition of “recreational activity,” arguing that it “leaves no room for an argument that relevantly
enlivens the distinction between sport that is undertaken or pursued for

136 Civil Liability Act 2002 (N.S.W.) s 5K; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas.) s 19; Civil
Liability Act 2002 (W. Austl.) s 5E.
137 Goode v Angland (2017) 96 NSWLR 503.
138 Dodge v Snell [2011] TASSC 19.
139 Id. ¶ 277.
140 Id. ¶ 261.
141 Thorpe & Houston, supra note 107.
142 Goode v Angland [2016] NSWSC 1014, ¶ 146.
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enjoyment, relaxation or leisure and sport that is undertaken or pursued as a profession or occupation.”143
The decision in Goode v Angland was appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal,144 which affirmed Judge Harrison’s construction of the term “recreational
activity” under section 5L of the Civil Liability Act (NSW).145 On appeal, Judge
Leeming expressed his respectful disagreement with Judge Wood in Dodge. He
considered it unhelpful to refer to the ordinary meaning or dictionary definition
of “recreational activity.”146 Consistent with Judge Harrison’s observation in
Goode, the three judges in the NSW Court of Appeal unanimously held that no
distinction should be drawn between sports participated in for recreational purposes and those participated in for professional purposes. 147 At the time of writing,
the High Court has not yet issued a judgment clarifying the interpretation of “recreational activity.” The NSW Court of Appeal’s decision therefore has significant
influence and should “apply in all jurisdictions that have adopted the uniform national legislation.”148 As Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gummow, Callinan,
Heydon, and Crennan in Farah Construction Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd149 asserted: “Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges in Australia should not depart from decisions in intermediate appellate courts in another jurisdiction on the
interpretation of Commonwealth legislation or uniform national legislation unless
they are convinced that the interpretation is plainly wrong.” 150 Applying the reasoning of the NSW Court of Appeal to our hypothetical case presented in the
Background section, motor racing activities (professional or amateur) fall within
the scope of “recreational activities” as defined under state civil liability legislation.

b. Meaning of “Dangerous Recreational Activity”
The second component of this defense concerns whether the recreational activity in question is dangerous. The dangerousness of an activity should be assessed on an objective and prospective basis 151 by determining “before the injury
was caused,” whether a reasonable observer in the plaintiff’s position “would
have regarded the recreational activity as dangerous.” 152 According to the Civil
Liability Act, a recreational activity is dangerous when it involves a significant
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risk of physical harm.153 Therefore, the interpretation of the phrase “significant
risk of physical harm” influences whether a motor race event constitutes a “dangerous recreational activity.”
The term “significant” is “capable of a very wide and general meaning,” 154
and the context in which it is used is crucial in its interpretation. Judge Ipp observed in Fallas v. Mourlas155 that the word “significant,” in the context of a dangerous recreational activity, should be construed with reference to the elements of
“both risk (which it expressly qualifies) and physical harm (which is indivisibly
part of the expression under consideration).” 156 In the same case, Judge Basten
considered three matters relevant in determining whether a particular risk is significant, specifically: (a) whether “the results of [the risk] eventuating are likely
to be catastrophic,”157 (b) whether the risk “[occurs] with significant frequency,”158 and (c) the relevance of participants’ particular circumstances to the
eventuation of risk, e.g., whether “they [are] fresh or tired, sober or inebriated and
whether they [are] known to be careful and responsible people.”159 Judge Ipp
adopted a similar approach in construing the phrase “significant risk of physical
harm” in Falvo v. Australian Oztag Sports Association,160 holding that “risk and
harm mutually [inform] each other”161 and indicating that both “the likelihood of
a particular risk materializing”162 and “the seriousness of the consequences of
such an event”163 are relevant to the risk assessment process. In Fallas, Judge Ipp
noted that whether the risk of physical harm is significant should be evaluated
based on the “circumstance of each individual case.” 164 He further stressed that
“factors such as time, place, competence, age, sobriety, equipment and even the
weather may make dangerous a recreational activity which would not otherwise
involve a risk of harm.”165 That is, a participant’s particular situation is of considerable relevance to the assessment of the activity’s level of risk.
Judge Ipp’s analysis of the relevance of these three factors (the likelihood of
occurrence of risks, the severity of physical injury, and the incompetence or carelessness of the injured participants) to risk assessment received much support in
subsequent court decisions, particularly in the judgments of Judge McColl of the
NSW Court of Appeal in Lormine Pty Ltd v Xuereb,166 Judge Ward of the NSW
153
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Court of Appeal in Campbell v Hay,167 and Judge Penfold of the Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal in the Stewart case.168 These courts adopted a consistent construction of the latter two factors. However, regarding the first factor,
likelihood of risk occurrence, they developed slightly different standards of interpretation. In Falvo and Fallas, Judge Ipp stated that the “likelihood” here should
be “more than trivial”169 to qualify a risk as significant. Consistent with Judge
Ipp’s construction, Judge McColl in Lormine further defined the scale of “likelihood” by stating that “[the] standard lies somewhere between a trivial risk and
one that is likely to occur.”170 Judge Tobias in Fallas and Judge Barrett in Campbell expressed similar views, using slightly different wording. Judge Tobias suggested that significant risk should be “not merely trivial but one which has a real
chance of materializing.”171 In contrast, Judge Barrett stated that the “scale of possibility of occurrence [should be] beyond trivial but short of likely.” 172
Given the foregoing analysis, determining whether motor racing competitions
are dangerous ought to be assessed with reference to these three factors. In view
of the number of media reports of accidents experienced by motorists in racing
competitions and the serious physical damage they have suffered as a result, the
“dangerous” element is not difficult to prove. Although a distinction can be made
between professional motorists and inexperienced amateur motorists, 173 motor
racing can generally be classified as dangerous. Accident records show that even
professional motorists face a certain likelihood of accidents in racing competitions.174 The scale of possibility of the occurrence of racing accidents can easily
pass the test of likelihood, regardless of whether significant risk is regarded as
“beyond trivial but short of likely”175 or having “a real chance of materialising.”176

c.

Materialization of Obvious Risk

This section analyzes whether the physical harm suffered by the motorist in
the present case resulted from the materialization of an obvious risk associated by
the racing competition. This analysis turns on the interpretation of two terms:
“materialization” and “obvious risk.” According to the definition of “obvious
risk” under the Civil Liability Act, one must determine “whether the risk which
resulted in [the plaintiff’s] suffering that harm would have been obvious to a
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reasonable person in his position.”177 Put another way, the “risk” here must be
“that which matured and caused [the plaintiff’s] injury.” 178 As Judge Walmsley
explained in Stewart v Ackland, the DRA defense serves to “save a potential tortfeasor [from harm] from an action arising from a risk which has come home rather
than one which has not.”179 Following this line of thought, the risk that renders a
recreational activity “dangerous” is distinct from “obvious risk that materializes.”180 Albeit overlapping in some situations, the two types of risk are distinguishable, and the DRA defense can be applied in a case “involving the materialization of an obvious risk of an activity that would not of itself have rendered the
activity ‘dangerous.’”181
In understanding “obvious risk” in this way, an issue that has long been controversial is the definition of “obvious risk which materialized.”182 In the case of
motor racing, the question is whether the risk to motorists is “generally a . . . risk
of suffering physical harm”183 during motor racing from any cause or “more narrowly the risk of”184 motorists suffering serious physical harm because of the organizer’s failure to provide immediate rescue and medical services upon the occurrence of accidents. How to characterize the risk is essential to determining
whether “the extent to which the probability of its occurrence is or is not readily
apparent to the reasonable person in the [plaintiff’s] position.”185 For example, in
Stewart v Ackland, Judge Penfold upheld the trial judge’s distinction between the
“perception of risk of minor harm” and the “perception of risk of a serious neck
injury,” and endorsed the trial judge’s observation that the latter risk was not obvious to the respondent.186 Likewise, in Fallas v Mourlas, Judge Basten stated that
if the risk was “that of harm flowing from the accidental discharge of a gun, whilst
pointed at the plaintiff, that risk was obvious to the plaintiff”;187 however, the risk
would not have been obvious if the plaintiff had taken “into account the assurances given by the defendant that the gun was not loaded at the relevant time.” 188
In Kelly v State of Queensland,189 Judge McMeekin distinguished between “the
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risk of serious injury from entering the water head first too close to the shore” 190
and “the risk of serious injury because of the possibility of the sand giving way or
tripping up at the crucial moment when running down” a sand dune into the water.191 Judge McMeekin found that the former was an obvious risk, whilst the latter
was not. The decision in this case was eventually appealed, and the full bench of
the Queensland Court of Appeal affirmed Judge McMeekin’s approach to the interpretation of “obvious risk.” 192
Despite the importance of this issue, to date there is a lack of a consistent
approach to characterizing or defining risk that allegedly materialized as satisfying the requirements for the application of the DRA defense. With respect to the
“level of precision with which the risk is defined,” 193 a great deal of uncertainty
and inconsistency has arisen in court decisions. It is recognized that the definition
of obvious risk “which is picked may be crucial,” 194 but courts frequently face
difficulties in articulating the reasons for their ultimate choice of definitions of
key legal elements. There are numerous debates surrounding how obvious risk
should be characterized,195 including one that is highly relevant to the context of
motor racing activities—that is, whether a sport organizer’s negligence should be
included in the definition of obvious risk. This is critical in determining whether
an obvious risk has materialized from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the position of the injured motorist.
In their Review of the Law of Negligence,196 the Ipp Panel envisioned the possibility of characterizing “a risk that a person will be negligent” as “obvious
risk.”197 The relevant case law shows that courts have often treated the alleged
negligent conduct of the defendant as part of the risk involved in the activity. In
Dodge v Snell, Judge Wood stated that risk characterization should be “refined
further by including facts such as the jockey at fault ignoring warning calls from
the jockeys in his pathway.”198 In Fallas v Mourlas, Judge Basten described what
eventuated as a risk of “accidental discharge of a gun whilst pointed at the plaintiff”199 and held that this was an obvious risk, regardless of “the [plaintiff’s]
knowledge, belief and circumstances which existed immediately prior to the
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discharge.”200 In the same judgment, Judge Ipp made a novel distinction between
gross negligence and negligence, arguing that if “the conduct that caused the risk
amounted to gross negligence, it [is] necessary . . . to determine whether the risk
of harm caused by gross negligence of the kind in question was obvious.”201 A
final example is Campbell v Hay, in which Judge Ward, with whom Judges Barrett
and Meagher agreed, highlighted the risk that “Mr. Hay would not be able to [land
the plane safely] or would, in an emergency situation, make an incorrect decision.”202
Conversely, a large body of court decisions point towards the exclusion of any
reference to a defendant’s negligence in the description of the risk involved. Judge
Dodd’s explanation in Mikronis v Adams is illuminating in this respect.203 He
wrote, “[i]t cannot be said that it is an obvious risk of an activity that persons
providing equipment and conditions for it will do so negligently and without care
for the safety of patrons in particular respects.”204 Similarly, Barbara McDonald
commented as follows:
Can a risk of negligence by a defendant in relation to a dangerous
activity ever be classed as an ‘obvious risk of the activity’? Surely,
it is the opposite; the reasonable expectation of any participant is
that the provider will take at least reasonable care. But expectations aside, it seems that the unspecified negligence of another
person is not a risk arising out of the activity itself. 205
Consistent with this reasoning, in Jaber v Rockdale City Council, the NSW
Court of Appeal judges agreed that it was not necessary to determine whether
Rockdale City Council had been negligent. It sufficed to characterize the risk at a
general level and determined that “diving into shallow water or water of uncertain
depth might result in injury.” 206 Similarly, in Streller v Albury City Council,207
when considering the types of risk arising from diving or jumping into a river,
Judge Meagher, with whom Judges Ward and Emmett agreed, considered it adequate to describe the risk broadly as the risk of the plaintiff’s “being injured from
impact with the riverbed” when using a rope swing to perform a backflip. 208

200

Id. ¶ 158.
Id. ¶ 54.
202 Campbell v Hay [2014] NSWCA 129, 149.
203 Mikronis v Adams [2004] 1 DCLR (NSW) 369, ¶ 74.
204 Id.
205 Barbara McDonald, Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia Tort, 27 SYDNEY L. REV.
443, 471 (2005).
206 Jaber v Rockdale City Council [2009] NSWCA 98, ¶¶ 29, 38, 59–60.
207 Streller v Albury City Council [2013] NSWCA 348.
208 Id. ¶ 32.
201

2022]

TORTIOUS LIABILITY IN CHINA’S MOTORSPORTS INDUSTRY

73

d. Risk Description in the Context of Motor Racing
As the above analysis shows, it remains unclear whether a sports event organizer’s potential negligence should form part of the description of the obvious risk
associated with the sport under Australian law. Inconsistencies in the opinions of
authorities may lead to uncertainty for legal advisers, sports event organizers, and
motorists themselves. As demonstrated above,209 how “obvious risk” is defined is
crucial to determining whether the risk in question would be obvious to a reasonable person in the position of an injured motorist and whether the organizers of
motorsports activities are entitled to apply the DRA defense to mitigate liability
associated with their failure to provide immediate medical and rescue assistance
to injured motorists.
Following the opinions in Mikronis, Jaber, and Streller, the risk that is said to
have materialized in a given case can be defined in a broad way, e.g., the risk of
serious physical injury while engaging in motor racing activities. A broader definition such as this lowers the threshold from “obvious” and thereby facilitates the
invocation of the DRA defense by sports organizers. In contrast, according to the
authorities in Fallas, Campbell, and Dodge, the risk should be described by reference to the defendant’s careless conduct. Thus, it is appropriate to describe the
risk in the present case as that of a motorist suffering serious physical injury due
to the sports event organizer’s failure to provide immediate medical service and
rescue support upon the occurrence of an accident. Given the close relationship
between motorsports organizers and motorists, as outlined above, 210 under this
interpretation, the risk concerned would not be considered obvious to a reasonable
motorist in the position of the injured motorist in the present case.

ii.

The Defense of Voluntary Assumption of Risk

The second defense available to a motor racing organizer under Australian tort
law is that of the VAR defense. The VAR defense was developed in the 19th century211 and is encapsulated by the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria (“to one who
is willing, no legal wrong is done”).212 The VAR defense was succinctly summarized in Imbree v McNeilly,213 in which Judges Gummow, Hayne, and Kiefel
stated as follows in a joint decision:
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Absent relevant statutory modification, the doctrine of voluntary
assumption of risk requires proof that “the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk .
. . impliedly agreed to incur it”. In the absence of some express
exclusion of liability or notice of exculpation, demonstrating that
a plaintiff both knew of a risk and voluntarily agreed to incur that
risk will often be difficult. But if both conditions are satisfied, the
plaintiff’s claim against the defendant will fail. 214
To date, no statutory modification of the common law VAR defense has been
applied to cases involving motor racing.215 In contrast with the defense of contributory negligence, the VAR defense takes an “all-or-nothing approach.”216 Under
this approach, “a plaintiff [who] voluntarily assumed the risk in question is readily
seen as equivalent to concluding that the defendant owed that plaintiff no duty of
care.”217 Therefore, if the VAR defense is successfully established, it “provides a
complete [defense]” against a claim for personal injury or death 218 and does not
enable the court to “apportion the loss[es] between the parties.” 219
The Imbree v. McNeilly decision laid out the two elements required to establish a VAR defense in this context: (a) the plaintiff had full knowledge of the facts
constituting the danger and sufficiently appreciated the danger inherent in the factual situation and (b) the plaintiff freely and willingly engaged in the dangerous
activity. It has been widely acknowledged in case law that the onus of proving
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these two elements rests squarely on the defendant.220 Applying this practice to
the current case, the responsibility lies with the motor racing organizer to prove
that the injured motorist “voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent
of the risk . . . agreed to [accept the risk]”221 inherent in motor racing.

a. Nature and Scope of the Plaintiff’s Knowledge
Australian case law requires the plaintiff’s knowledge to be actual rather than
constructive.222 In addition, the scope of the plaintiff’s knowledge should extend
to the particular risk that is alleged to have materialized. The requirement of actual
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff was well described in Scanlon v American
Cigarette Company (Overseas) Pty Ltd. (No 3),223 in which Judge Nicholson
wrote, “[i]n all of those cases are to be found expressions of judicial opinion that
actual, rather than constructive knowledge on the part of a plaintiff is necessary
in order for the defense to be made out.”224 Similarly, in Roggenkamp v Bennett,225
Judges McTiernan and Williams stated that “in order to establish this defense, the
plaintiff must be shown not only to have perceived the existence of danger, for
this alone would be insufficient,” but also to have “fully appreciated it and voluntarily accepted the risk.”226
Australian case law shows that a successful defense based on VAR requires
the defendant to prove that the plaintiff had foreseen or contemplated the extent
of the particular risk eventuated, as opposed to “the whole risk”227 in a general
sense. In Kent v Scattini,228 Judge Jackson of the Supreme Court of Western Australia struck down the defendant’s use of the VAR defense to mitigate his liability
on the grounds that the plaintiff had neither consented to “the defendant driving
around the bend in Gatacre Road at a fast speed”229 nor foreseen “the likelihood
of the [defendant] doing so.”230 Similarly, in analysis of the elements of the VAR
defense in the NSW case of Oran Park v Fleissig,231 Judge Einstein emphasized
the precise nature and extent of the risk that the plaintiff is required to contemplate, observing that the defendant “bear[s] the onus of proving that [the plaintiff]
consented not only to some risk of injury but to the particular risk which
220
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culminated in injury.”232 Recently, in Monie v Commonwealth of Australia,233 the
NSW Court of Appeal cited Judges McTiernan and Williams’s statement in
Roggenkamp with approval and declared that “[m]ere knowledge that a risk exists
is not the same as consenting to the risk;” 234 “[t]here must be an assent to undertake the [particular] risk with the full appreciation of its extent.” 235
The cases examined above suggest that if the motorsports organizer in the case
examined here were to resort to the VAR defense under Australian law, it would
need to prove that the motorist had “full knowledge of the nature and extent of the
[particular] risk”236 that he encountered. “Particular risk” in this context refers to
the risk of the organizer’s failure to provide injured motorists with immediate and
appropriate medical and rescue assistance upon the occurrence of motor racing
accidents.237 Considering “all the circumstances”238 surrounding motor racing activities, the following two aspects are relevant in assessing whether motorists are
able to foresee such a particular risk: the dangerous nature of motor racing and
the risk warning issued by the sports event organizer.
Regarding the first aspect, due to the dangerous nature of motor racing activities and the high incidence of motor racing accidents reported by medical platforms over the past two decades, it is possible for motorists to foresee and comprehend the general risks present in motor racing (e.g., collisions) as well as the
type and extent of the harm flowing from the materialization of these general risks
(e.g., death or physical injury). However, it is difficult for motorists to foresee the
particular risk of organizers’ negligent failure to provide immediate rescue and
medical assistance in the case of collisions, largely due to the proximate relationship between motorists and organizers. As explained above, 239 due to organizers’
complete control over the carrying out of motor racing events, motorists can expect organizers to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of all of the motorists of such an event, which includes the provision of such medical services.
Regarding the second aspect, it is a general principle of contract law that, in
the absence of misrepresentations by the defendant, a plaintiff who signs a contract is bound by the contract’s terms as to exclusion of liability, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff lacks subjective awareness of its content. 240 In the context
of the VAR defense, a motorsports organizer’s proper warning of risks has a direct
bearing on a motorist’s comprehension of the nature and extent of the risk associated with motor racing. Judges Gummow, Hayne, and Kiefel noted in Imbree v
McNeilly241 that “[i]n the absence of some express exclusion of liability or notice
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of exculpation, demonstrating that a plaintiff both knew of a risk and voluntarily
agreed to incur that risk will often be difficult.” 242
Similarly, in Roggenkamp, Judges McTiernan and Williams explained the role
of “proper [risk] warning” in determining whether a plaintiff “fully appreciated
and voluntarily accepted the risk,” suggesting that whether the plaintiff fully appreciated the risk involved is a question of fact that “may be inferred from [the
plaintiff’s] conduct” on a case-by-case basis.243 The “proper warning” given by
the defendant can provide insights into this inference-drawing process.
For participants in a motor racing event to fully appreciate the particular risk
at issue upon the receipt of a risk warning, the content of the warning must be
“sufficiently specific”244— it should include the “[specific] nature of the particular risk concerned”245 and remind motorists of the “explicit danger” 246 to participants inherent in motor racing activities. In the present case, as previously discussed, the motorsports organizer indeed issued a warning of the risks, which was
incorporated into the waiver and read:
I acknowledge, assume, and admit, that risks reside in the activity
conducted within the area of racing circuit, or by utilizing the
track, facility or service provided by the organizer, due to the factors including but not limited to space, weather, temperature, or
facility maintenance, the action/inaction of other people, and/or
other factors, and would possibly lead to personal injury, death,
and property loss. After a full deliberation and contemplation of
risks, which I understood, assumed, and admitted, I acknowledge
that I voluntarily participate in activities, and agree to assume all
the risks above-mentioned.247
However, a literal reading of this warning reveals that its content is expressed in
a general manner.248 Although the warning lists certain risks that a motorist may
encounter while motor racing, it makes no explicit mention of the particular risk
that is at issue in the present case. Nor does it warn of the “general nature of the
particular risk concerned.”249 Such a warning made it difficult for the organizer in
this case to “discharge [their] evidentiary onus” 250 such that the motorists fully
appreciated the risk of the organizer’s negligent failure to provide appropriate rescue and medical support for injured motorists.
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b. Voluntary Acceptance of Risk
For the VAR defense to succeed, the sports organizer must prove, in addition
to element (a)—that the motorist fully contemplated “the nature and extent of the
risk”251 he encountered—element (b), that the injured motorist “voluntarily
agreed to accept [that particular] risk.”252 Proving element (b) is thus conditional
upon proving element (a). To meet the threshold of “voluntary acceptance of
risk,” the motorist must be shown to have been “truly willing” to assume that
particular risk and “in a position to choose freely.” 253 In New South Wales v
Fahy,254 when assessing the scope of application of the VAR defense in Australia,
Judge Kirby cited the English Court of Appeal case Bowater v. Rowley Regis
Corp.,255 specifically Justice Scott’s statement:
For the purpose of the rule [of voluntary assumption of risk], if it
be a rule, a man cannot be said to be truly ‘willing’ unless he is in
a position to choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not
only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise
of choice is conditioned, so that he may be able to choose wisely,
but the absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint so that
nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will. 256
Applying Justice Scott’s reasoning and considering Australian law, assuming
that the motorsports organizer in the present case can prove element (a), he must
also prove that the injured motorist chose freely to assume the particular risk of
the organizer’s failure to provide immediate rescue and medical assistance to injured motorists. Two arguments are relevant to this scenario. First, the signing of
a waiver is a necessity for motorists to participate in motor racing. The waiver is
often expressed in the form of a standard contract, and motorists are deprived of
the opportunity to negotiate the rationality and necessity of particular clauses.
This arguably renders motorists’ decision to sign the waiver, as it is written, nonvoluntary.257 Second, in contradistinction, motorists are often highly paid under
employment contracts due to the dangerous nature of motor racing. They fully
understand the formal requirement of signing waivers and, given the relevance of
the included warnings to the motorists’ own implementation of necessary safety
measures, it is reasonable to expect that they read the clauses containing warnings
of risks carefully before engaging in the associated motor racing competitions.
Motorists therefore intentionally engage in hazardous motor racing competitions
in exchange for high payment. It can be argued that they “freely and voluntarily”
251
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accept the particular risk inherent in racing.258 This line of reasoning appeared in
the English case of Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corp.,259 in which Justice Scott observed:
When the servant is engaged specifically for the performance of a
dangerous duty and the presence of the danger is a mutually recognized element in the bargain for remuneration, the servant obviously undertakes the risk for the sake of higher pay . . . in contracts of employment where the service is hazardous and for that
reason highly paid it is not easy to imagine a circumstance in
which the hazard causing the hurt to the servant is also attributable
to the negligence of the master.260

IV. IMPLICATIONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
The discussion in Section II shows that Chinese law faces the following two
types of uncertainty in addressing motor racing cases: (a) the consequences associated with the invocation of defense under Article 1176 of the Chinese Civil Code
(i.e., whether it is a complete defense or a mitigating factor) and (b) the understanding of “risk” in the application of the VAR defense. Although the Australian
legal context differs in certain respects from its Chinese counterpart, the uses of
the DRA and VAR defenses in the Australian context may provide insights for
the development of Chinese law with respect to these uncertainties. Below is a
discussion of the application of the VAR defense and the direction of the law in
resolving uncertainties regarding the proper application of Article 1176.

A. Application of the VAR Defense
Article 1176 of the Chinese Civil Code establishes the VAR defense in the
Chinese tort law system.261 The analysis in the Legal Issues in Sports Injury
Claims section summarizes the uncertainties regarding the VAR defense and the
problems with its application in the context of motor racing activities. For example, although legislators have emphasized the importance of risk in invoking the
VAR defense and in evaluating the liabilities for which organizers are responsible,
they have fallen far short of elaborating the consequences flowing from the invocation of the VAR defense (partial versus complete exemption from liability), the
perspectives from which risks are assessed (the foreseeable, high risk inherent in
the activity itself, as opposed to the risk arising from the participants’ or the organizers’ negligence) and the standards for the interpretation of these risks (the
risks as evaluated from the perspective of an objective third party in the position
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of the participants or the subjective risk envisaged by the participants themselves).262 Thus, there is a long-standing debate amongst Chinese scholars and
practitioners as to what elements constitute the VAR defense and how the VAR
defense is effectuated. Furthermore, the wording of Article 1176 merely focuses
on the liabilities between participants; it makes no explicit mention of the interaction between participants and organizers.263 This gives rise to considerable uncertainty as to how and to what extent the VAR defense can be applied to mitigate
the organizer’s negligent liability in its failure to provide immediate medical and
rescue assistance to injured motorists.264
Analysis of the use of the DRA and VAR defenses in Australia can provide
insights into the questions that Chinese law encounters in two respects, which are
interrelated, namely the nature of the risk that matters for applying the VAR defense under Chinese law and the weight that should be given to the plaintiff’s
knowledge regarding the risk. The DRA and VAR defenses have the same effect
on the liability of the motorsports event organizer in the present case; as the Ipp
Panel explained in the Review of the Law of Negligence, “the effect of the provision [under the DRA defense] can also be explained in terms of the defense of
assumption of risk.”265 The rationale for both defenses lies in the “[core] value of
the common law which gives primacy to personal autonomy” 266 and the “paramountcy of a person’s entitlement ‘to make his own decisions about his life.’”267
To strike a balance between the protection of motorists’ autonomy to decide to
participate in the dangerous activity of motor racing and the policy concern of
holding sports organizers accountable for the provision of an appropriate and safe
racing environment for motorists, Australian legislators and courts have established onerous conditions for the application of the two defenses. As explained
above, the way in which “obvious risk” is construed—whether the risk that resulted in the plaintiff’s harm would have been obvious to a reasonable person in
his position—is crucial to assessing whether the DRA defense can be invoked.
Whether a risk is obvious has a bearing on whether a motorist had adequate
knowledge of it when deciding in advance whether to engage in the activity. The
“obviousness” requirement demonstrates the balance-striking motivation embedded in the DRA defense, in that a person should not be allowed to recover damages flowing from the materialization of a risk that is obvious to them and that
they are willing to take.
Similarly, following Australia’s lead, to invoke the VAR defense, the organizer should be required to prove that the motorist was “[fully] aware of the risk”
and that the plaintiff’s decision to accept that risk was made “freely and voluntarily” and not “subject to [any] external pressure or influence.” 268 While the defense
262
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insulates organizers from motorists’ damage claims, organizers’ onerous burden
of proof makes this difficult, which encourages them to take reasonable care in
providing safe racing facilities as well as appropriate medical support to motorists.
Furthermore, courts reserve the discretion to determine whether the risk involved
in a given scenario is obvious to, or can be fully contemplated and apprehended
by, the motorist harmed in that scenario. By defining risks “narrowly [or] at a high
level of detail,”269 courts can determine to what extent and in what ways each
defense can be applied. Depending on the circumstances of a particular case,
courts are able to “apportion the loss between the parties and to give effect to
complex judgments of responsibility.” 270
In contrast with Australian law, the VAR defense under Article 1176 of the
Chinese Civil Code is riddled with uncertainties. Given that legislators in China
are also tasked with balancing the interests of motor racing organizers and motorists, Australia’s DRA and VAR defenses are particularly insightful in one important respect, namely, specifying the conditions under which the VAR defense
can be invoked. While the introduction of the VAR defense to the area of motor
racing is appropriate, the lack of a principled approach to its application is a concern. The priority for Chinese legislators therefore should be to formulate specific
guidelines for the application of the VAR defense.
Specifically, drawing upon Australian law, Chinese legislators should reform
the law to prescribe that when the risk resulting in a participant’s harm is a risk
inherent to the activity and obvious to the participants in advance, the VAR defense should be available to exempt the organizer from liability. Australia’s experience has proved that this approach is conducive to balancing the interests of
organizers of and participants in motor racing activities. Furthermore, Chinese
legislators and courts should more clearly define the types of risks triggering the
VAR defense, specifically defining the inherent risks of the activity and the characterization of a particular risk as “obvious” to a participant. With reference to the
Australian interpretation of the defense (e.g., whether the results of the risk’s
eventuating are likely to be catastrophic and whether the risk occurs with significant frequency271), Chinese courts should develop these elements through judicial
interpretation to provide clearer guidelines for motorists and motorsports event
organizers.
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B. Resolving Uncertainties over the Application of Article 1176
There are three major sources of uncertainty regarding the proper application
of Article 1176. The first concerns the scope and content of the duty of safety
protection, as this duty overlaps with the provisions of Article 1176 under certain
circumstances. The second is that there is no clear distinction between the VAR
defense in a general context and as applied under Article 1176, which leads to the
application of fault-based liability when the circumstances warrant a full exemption. The third source of uncertainty lies in Article 1176 itself. As the statute does
not establish the legal elements required to invoke Article 1176’s VAR defense,
courts must resort to their own interpretations of the defense, inviting inconsistent
decisions. As the third source of uncertainty is addressed in detail above, the following discussion is limited to the remaining two.
Concerning the present case, the timely provision of effective rescue should
be part of a motorsports event organizer’s duty of safety protection, not only because the rationale underlying the duty support the inclusion of this specific duty
but also because injury is highly likely to occur during these types of dangerous
activities. When such activities are organized and involve numerous participants,
it is reasonably foreseeable that the failure to provide timely and effective rescue
will have catastrophic consequences. Alternatively, if the duty to provide such
services is left to contractual agreements between parties, which are generally
drafted by the organizers, such contracts may assign the parties’ rights and interests in a way that is prejudicial to the participants. To advance the public interest
and promote such activities, the law should hold organizers accountable for their
negligent failure to ensure the safety of participants by holding them responsible
for the risks common to these types of activities. Otherwise, cases such as the
present case will continue to be brought to court.
Further, given how courts construe other aspects of organizers’ duty of safety
protection, there is a risk that they will vary in their approaches to assessing
whether the organizers have properly carried out this specific duty “within a reasonable scope,” e.g., by considering the professional reputation, economic status,
and other individual circumstances of organizers or by limiting the extent of liability to the relevant time, venue, and subject. In contrast, if the legislation were
to specifically include medical and rescue services in the duty of safety protection,
it would provide a starting point for a consistent approach to implementing the
duty.
The authors reviewed several cases to determine how the courts view organizers’ duty of safety protection in the motorsports context and how the VAR defense affects its application.272 Courts ascertaining the content of organizers’ duty
of safety protection in the context of go-kart racing activities have identified the
following specific duties: the duty to provide sufficient technical instructions and
safety guidance during the operation of a go-kart racing business,273 the duty to
272
273
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manage the venue by setting proper tracks to separate various categories of gokarting to reduce the chance of collision, 274 the duty to provide qualified staff on
site to assist the participants,275 and the duty to implement and enforce a comprehensive safety management system.276 Regrettably, none of these cases explicitly
mentioned the specific duty of providing effective and timely rescue. However,
one case did adopt the “reasonableness” test from the judicial interpretation, restricting the scope of the organizer’s duty of safety protection to “the risk that
organizers are able to foresee, control and prevent.” 277
It is noteworthy that all the above-mentioned cases were decided before 2020,
before Article 1176 came into effect. In the first case applying the Article 1176
VAR defense, the court cautioned that sports ethics and the rules of the game are
relevant factors in evaluating whether the duty of care has been properly exercised
in the context.278 Although this case did not involve an organizer, given the similar
context, this article argues that sports ethics, the rules of the game and industry
practices should likewise be considered relevant factors in evaluating organizers’
proper execution of their duty to provide timely and effective rescue. Organizers
should be able to demonstrate that the measures they adopt meet the standards
commonly accepted by the industry and the ethical standards and rules of the
game to support a claim that they have fulfilled their duty.
The law should make clear the distinction between the general VAR defense
and the VAR defense under Article 1176, and Article 1176 should apply only to
the specific context of “activities carrying certain risk” and that it should carry the
legal effect of completely exempting organizers from liability if successfully established. However, to invoke the defense, organizers should be required to meet
a certain threshold as defined by specific legal elements. One suggested element
is that the organizer may only invoke the defense against participants in the activities in question, not against other parties. For instance, in the case of the elderly
woman entering a basketball court cited above,279 the court would apply the general fault-based principle in assessing both sides’ liability, rather than invoking
the Article 1176 VAR defense.
Another proposed element is that the participant’s harm must have resulted
from the materialization of an inherent risk associated with the relevant activity.
If not, the Article 1176 VAR defense will not apply; instead, the general faultbased liability principle will apply. In that context, the focus of the court’s risk
analysis will be on whether the participant had been informed of a specific risk
274
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via the organizer’s warnings. If so, the organizer can claim exemption from liability. The organizer will have the burden of proving that the participant was
aware of the scope and nature of the specific risk when engaging in the activity
and freely and willingly agreed to assume this risk.
This Article proposes that the Article 1176 defense should provide complete
exemption from liability. This raises the following questions. If an organizer is
negligent in fulfilling its duty of safety protection, thereby contributing to the
harm caused to a participant, should this preclude the organizer from invoking the
Article 1176 defense, even though the harm could be said to have arisen from the
inherent risks of the activity? Would gross negligence result in a different legal
outcome? In the context of organized, highly dangerous sports, cultural, or social
activities, legislators should specify certain irreducible core duties on the part of
the organizer, e.g., the duty of providing timely and effective rescue. In addition,
organizers must be prohibited from relying on Article 1176 in cases of gross negligence in exercising these irreducible core duties. The reasoning for this is that
participants engaging in such activities cannot be expected to foresee the risks
brought by organizers’ violation of such duties. This would be consistent with
Article 1176’s current approach to tortious liability among participants in that liabilities arising from participants’ grossly negligent or intentional conduct are not
exempted.

V. CONCLUSION
Article 1176 of the Chinese Civil Code must be refined to address uncertainties regarding the assessment of organizers’ liability in the context of dangerous
sports activities. This Article indicates how such reform could proceed, such as
by clarifying the key term “risk” as referring to the inherent risks associated with
such activities. Even more importantly, the revised Article 1176 provision should
clarify how the special context of activities “carrying certain risk” will affect the
operation of the defense that Article 1176 provides. As proposed above, in applying Article 1176, the courts must distinguish the VAR defense under Article 1176
from the general VAR defense, due to Article 1176’s focus on a specific context.
The legislative intent of Article 1176 admits the possibility of allowing sports
organizers to invoke Article 1176 as a complete defense for liability arising from
sports accidents. Further, Australia’s DRA and VAR defenses could be particularly helpful in specifying the conditions under which the VAR defense is to be
invoked for the purpose of revising the statute.
Moreover, this Article posits that the provision of adequate medical support
and effective rescue should be deemed part of the duty of safety protection imposed on organizers, as harm is highly likely to occur when engaging in these
types of dangerous activities. Legislators should consider specifying certain irreducible core elements of the duty of safety protection. Article 1176’s provisions
overlap with the enforcement of organizers’ duty of safety protection in numerous
respects, rendering it difficult to achieve a principled approach to applying the
article without a clear definition of the phrase “duty of safety protection.”
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Legislators and courts should balance the interests of organizers and participants
when determining their respective obligations and liabilities. Establishing irreducible elements would avoid the imposition of disproportionate duties and the unfair
assignment of losses flowing from the materialization of risks inherently associated with the activities themselves.

